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Chapter 1 
Original Sin 
 
 
 When my family first moved from Germany to Baltimore we lived across from 
the inner harbor in historic Federal Hill. Federal Hill is one of the oldest neighborhoods 
in Baltimore City with homes dating back to the mid nineteenth century. E. Montgomery 
Street is paved with cobblestones, lined on either side with traditional Baltimore row 
houses. Three marble steps lead up to the front door of a home no wider than thirteen feet 
across. These narrow row houses had once been the homes of black dock workers and 
called “alley homes” because of their close proximity to one another. Today, Federal Hill 
is one of the most sought after neighborhoods in Baltimore. Homes once perceived only 
fit for black occupancy are now worth over one million dollars. When I first moved to 
Federal Hill it was not the gentrified, trendy neighborhood it is today. 
 For the first three years of my life in Baltimore I attended PS #45. Federal Hill 
Elementary was one of the better public schools in Baltimore. Classes were small, 
teachers knew your name, and students were generally bright. Our student body was 
racially and socio economically diverse. Race was not something I was conscious of as a 
kindergarten and first grade student.  
 When I was in first grade an older student brought a knife into school and held it 
up to another student’s throat. The student wielding the knife was black and the other 
student’s throat was white. Within a month my parents pulled me out of public school 
and sent me to a private school in the suburbs. This was the first time I realized that there 
was a difference between white and black – this was the first time I realized there was 
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such a thing called race and that people made judgments based on the color of someone’s 
skin. When the new school year started my family joined the ranks of millions of other 
middle class white families before us and moved to the suburbs. We became the epitome 
of the larger white exodus to the suburbs because my parents believed that downtown 
Baltimore was dangerous based largely on its racial composition.  
 As I got older the racial segregation of Baltimore became increasingly apparent.  
The neighborhood to which I moved, Roland Park, one of the first neighborhoods to 
enforce racially restrictive covenants in Baltimore, is a racially and socio-economically 
homogenous community comprised of relatively wealthy white residents. My parents and 
my friends’ parents often warned us that there were certain neighborhoods we couldn’t 
enter because of their racial composition. Walking through downtown Baltimore the 
residential separation of black and white is glaringly obvious. Beyond the border of the 
gentrified inner harbor and surrounding Federal Hill, Fells Point and Canton 
neighborhoods, street after street of abandoned, dilapidated, Baltimore row homes 
comprise densely populated black neighborhoods.  Popular culture has even reduced 
Baltimore to an archetype of decaying cities across the United States. Television shows1 
including HBO’s The Wire attribute Baltimore’s decline into crime, drug addiction and 
poverty to the simple explanation of white flight and black mismanagement of the city. 
However here I wanted to look “under the wire”, underneath images of the most visible 
social ills known for destroying America’s cities. Quiet as it is kept, Baltimore City has 
played host to and been shaped by a much more enduring, and many times legal vice: 
                                                
1 The Wire is not the only show about Baltimore City – Homicide: Life on the Street and 
The Corner (the book which it was adapted from was written by David Simon and Ed 
Burns, producer and creators of The Wire).  
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residential segregation. At the heart of the city’s history lies a dark and shameful fact: 
Baltimore was the first city in the United States to write into law residential segregation 
ordinances that banned blacks and whites from living side by side. Baltimore’s 
segregation ordinances became a model for cities around the country. Though the 
ordinances were ruled unconstitutional seven years later their effects have shaped the 
lived experiences and the built environment of Baltimore City up to the present. The 
subsequent slum clearance agenda, the introduction of racially biased real estate practices 
through redlining, racially restrictive covenants and blockbusting, and finally the race 
based site selection of federal housing project locations around the city have made 
Baltimore a tale of two cities, one black and one white. 
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Chapter 2 
Residential Segregation Ordinance 
 
 
Baltimore was one of the first metropolitan hubs of the new republic. At its 
foundation Baltimore was a city of contradictions, a city of both North and South, a city 
of black and white, one of freedom and of bondage. Founded in 1729, Baltimore played 
an integral role in the events leading up to the American Revolution as one of the first 
cities to resist British taxation. In September of 1814, after burning Washington, D.C., 
the British moved to Baltimore. There, soldiers successfully defended the Baltimore 
harbor from the British at Fort McHenry. These events led Francis Scott Key, a Maryland 
lawyer, to write the Star Spangled Banner, which would later become our national 
anthem. Baltimore became a major shipping and manufacturing center with the creation 
of the Baltimore Ohio Railroad in 1830. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries Baltimore was a vital center of American commercial activity due to the 
railroad as well as the shipping and ship building industries that occupied Baltimore’s 
ports. By 1860 Baltimore had built a strong mercantile culture and had the fourth largest 
population in the United States.1 
Maryland wrestled with the issue of slavery as a state uniquely positioned in 
between the North and the South. Though slavery prospered throughout the state, 
Maryland was also the first Southern state to have an Abolition Society and Baltimore 
boasted a large population of free blacks.2 Though free blacks created their own schools, 
learned trades, bought their freedom, and had modest power to protect their freedom 
through litigation, their freedom was also restricted in substantial ways.3 Free blacks in 
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Maryland were restricted from working certain occupations, keeping dogs as pets, 
carrying fire arms, or attending a religious service unless conducted by an ordained white 
minister.4 Even after Maryland rewrote its constitution in 1867 to reflect a growing desire 
for securing the socio-economic advantages of citizenship through its Declaration of 
Rights, free blacks struggled to obtain basic legal privileges. As Maryland’s black 
population grew, politicians could no longer ignore what was becoming a vocal political 
body. Political opposition reported that, “during the republican regime a minority of the 
colored population made themselves particularly offensive to the better elements of both 
races so that the ‘race problem’ was for the next decade sharply injected into politics.”5 
Thus, the conflict between the races shifted from an issue of enslavement to a question of 
participation in city affairs.  
By 1860, Baltimore had the highest population of free blacks of any city.  Of its 
212,418 inhabitants, 27,898 were black and 25,680 were free black residents (See 
Appendix 24). Between 1880 and 1900 Baltimore’s black population increased from 
54,000 to 79,000 (See Appendix 24). There was little conflict between white and black 
city residents throughout the 1870s and 1880s. Baltimore’s black and white residents 
were distributed throughout the city’s twenty wards and lived side-by-side without 
conflict.6 Baltimore reflected the melting pot that came to define the United States. In 
addition to a rapidly growing black community, more than thirty nationalities and races 
made up Baltimore’s population.7 
In the 1890s, industrialization and job opportunities brought immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe as well as former slaves to Baltimore. Like the white 
Europeans immigrants these former slaves were drawn by the possibility of employment.  
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However, unlike the free blacks that had established a community in Baltimore before the 
Civil War, the new blacks were from rural areas and tended to be unskilled and poor.8 
The new black Baltimoreans crowded together in “alley districts” that would become 
Baltimore’s first slums. Alley districts were characteristic residential districts for blacks 
in southern cities. Alleys were generally unpaved and muddy, lined on either side with 
cheaply constructed row homes crowded closely together. Those who could afford to 
move out did so and migrated to the north and west from the central and eastern districts 
of the city. As the slums took shape, wealthy property owners sought a means to confine 
blacks and the diseases they believed came along with them. Laws created by Baltimore 
City officials demanded residential segregation in Baltimore City at the turn of the 
twentieth century and although the ordinances only lasted seven years, their effects are 
still visible today.  
 On Christmas Day 1925 the New York Times published the following headline: 
Baltimore Tries Drastic Plan of Race Segregation. The story began, “On last Monday, 
December 19, the City Council of Baltimore passed and the Mayor signed what was 
probably the most remarkable ordinance ever entered upon the records of town or city of 
this country…”9 Ordinance No. 610 “for preserving order, securing property values and 
promoting the great interests and insuring the good government of Baltimore City”10 was 
intended to achieve racial separation using citywide legislation. The ordinance was 
prompted by the decision of a young black lawyer, George W. McMechen, to move his 
family from Prestman Street in northwest Baltimore several blocks east onto McCulloh 
Street. McMechen was a graduate of Yale Law School and a well-respected lawyer; he 
was married to a schoolteacher and together they had three young daughters.11 Despite 
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the fact that the McMechen’s were respectable neighbors, the residents of the 1800 block 
of McCulloh Street failed to notice anything about the McMechen’s except the color of 
their skin. A few days later the white residents of McCulloh Street met with neighbors 
from the Madison Avenue, McCulloh Street, and Eutaw Place Improvement Association 
to appeal to the city council to seal off their neighborhood from black residence. They 
appealed to the Baltimore City Council for help. Baltimore City Councilman Samuel 
Dashiell replied to mounting complaints about blacks moving into white residential areas, 
“I am only able to say that the colored person, considered to represent the most 
enlightened of the negro race, should have established his home in the midst of his race 
and that he should have encouraged others of his race to do likewise…”12 From this 
discourse emerged the first attempt to legally segregate blacks and whites in the United 
States. The Baltimore City Council became the first body in the United States to enact a 
residential segregation order. 
The ordinance banned any white person from moving onto a block the majority of 
whose occupants were black and banned any black person from moving onto a block the 
majority of whose occupants were white. Throughout the nineteenth century Baltimore 
City was not segregated based on race or class. However this fluid racial organization of 
space began to change as industrialization and urbanization altered the landscape of cities 
across the United States. Baltimore’s first slums were occupied by incoming blacks with 
little money and limited job opportunities. Poor southern black immigrants crowded 
together in a neighborhood called “Pigtown” in southwest Baltimore. Pigtown soon 
became the city’s first sizeable slum.13 Black residents moved to northwest Baltimore as 
middle class white residents, enticed by new cable and electric carlines as well as more 
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space, moved to the suburbs. By 1908 the twenty-six-block area along Pennsylvania 
Avenue, beginning at Franklin Street and extending north to the intersection of Druid Hill 
and North Avenues, became “the” area for black Baltimore residents. By 1910 Madison 
Avenue, Eutaw Place, Linden Avenue and McCulloh Street, all parallel to Pennsylvania 
and Druid Hill Avenues, became the desired streets for affluent black Baltimore City 
residents. Slowly wealthier blacks moved northwest to neighborhoods like Biddle Alley, 
but poor living conditions followed close behind. Even those blacks that could afford to 
move out of Pigtown could not afford first-hand housing and thus slums too developed in 
the Biddle Alley neighborhood where blacks were the majority by 1903.  
Blacks were not the only slum dwellers. Between 1870 and 1900 Baltimore City’s 
population grew from just over 260,00 to over 500,000 (See Appendix 24). This 
population increase was composed of European refugees, blacks and ex-confederates 
who flocked to Baltimore. Immigrants and blacks faced the same problems – little 
money, few jobs and housing shortages. Shared conditions resulted in overcrowded 
homes that were poorly ventilated and lacked adequate plumbing.14 Immigrants tended to 
occupy dwellings that black residents had abandoned in East Baltimore. By the time 
immigrants moved in, however, these homes were third rate and in serious disrepair. 
Thus both black residents and immigrants were forced to live in a rapidly aging and 
deteriorating housing stock due to lack of money. Families could not afford even the 
cheapest housing so they were forced to double and triple up creating drastically 
overcrowded neighborhoods. Urbanization, industrialization and economic depression 
had created a population of poor and sick inhabitants in Baltimore City. As disease began 
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to spread throughout the slums of Baltimore City social reform became a necessity and 
whites used health as a catalyst to advocate for containment.  
At the end of the nineteenth century Jacob Riis published a book documenting the 
plight of the urban poor. How the Other Half Lives became a best seller. Images of slum 
conditions and overcrowding awakened upper and middle class American’s to the 
dangerous conditions that existed in their backyards. Riis’s pioneering work in 
photojournalism prompted the United States Congress to direct the Commissioner of 
Labor to make “a full investigation relative to what is known as the slums of the city.”15 
The study was to focus on the substandard living conditions of the poor. In 1894 the 
Labor Commissioner released a report on The Slums of Baltimore, Chicago, New York 
and Philadelphia. The study argued that the characterization of impoverished 
neighborhoods as “slums” helped to justify the community’s response to poverty and 
racial inequality.16 The study reached two surprising conclusions about Baltimore City. 
First, its statistics demonstrated “no greater sickness prevailing in the [slum] district than 
in other parts of the cities involved.”17 Second, the study determined that white people 
represented the great mass of people residing in the slums. The study suggested that 
Baltimore slums were 95.85% white and 4.12% black.18 These surprising conclusions 
were ultimately proven to be inaccurate since the commissioner selected a 
“representative” district at the center of the slum population from which black 
neighborhoods were omitted. The study included the all-white eastside neighborhoods 
and excluded the west side black districts of Hughes Street, Pigtown and Biddle Alley.19 
Though this inaccurate neighborhood cross-section showed unwillingness on the part of 
the Labor Commissioner to associate slums with race, because of the report Baltimore 
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City officials were forced to confront issues presented by slum conditions that had been 
previously ignored. At the turn of the century, the government of Baltimore City became 
dominated by a reform agenda.     
 During the early twentieth century a movement designed to ameliorate social ills 
swept the nation. The Progressive Movement was a product of the desire for a more 
scientific approach to philanthropy. Focused primarily on housing of the poor, conditions 
in factories, child labor and mental health care reform, members of the Progressive 
Movement sought legislation to enact social change. Baltimore City had two different 
types of social reformers: some joined the already established Progressive Movement in 
opposing political machines and in advocating civil service reform, the merit system, 
streamlined government, home rule, and corrupt-practices legislation,20 while another 
group of reformers who came from universities and churches had a different agenda. The 
second set of progressive reformers became a part of the Social Reform Movement. 
The Social Reform Movement in Baltimore, led by the President of Johns 
Hopkins University Daniel Coit Gilman, advocated initiatives designed to remedy the 
fundamental ills of society.21 Unlike the Progressives who favored government action to 
quickly enact change, social reformers sought gradual transformation through the 
coordination of smaller social groups. Social reformers found support for their efforts 
among the medical community. In the 1890s, Dr. William Osler, physician-in-chief at 
Johns Hopkins Hospital, called attention to the social implications of typhoid and 
tuberculosis and supported efforts to establish a pure water system. His colleague, Dr. 
William Henry Welch, estimated that a better sanitation system in American cities could 
save up to 100,000 lives each year. In 1897, Dr. John S. Fulton, Dr. Osler and Dr. Welch 
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founded the Maryland Public Health Association. The association discussed proposals for 
the construction of a sanitary sewer system and establishment of a city hospital for 
infectious diseases (though the latter was poorly received and ultimately denied for fear 
of reduced property values and spread of disease surrounding the selected neighborhood 
site.)22  
By 1902 the state government began a citywide campaign against tuberculosis. 
This brought attention to the desperate housing situation in Baltimore since the campaign 
stressed the relationship between overcrowding, lack of open space, tainted food and a 
high incidence of tuberculosis. Since the black community occupied the worst housing 
throughout the city, it was not surprising that the death rate of black residents from both 
smallpox and tuberculosis was twice that of the white average.23 Though many attempts 
were made to create charity organizations, settlement houses, playgrounds and public 
baths, such initiatives failed to abolish poverty, prevent crime or to cure tuberculosis and 
other infectious diseases. Thus, social reformers began to focus on a symptom rather than 
the cause. As expressed by Baltimore Mayor Thomas Hayes in 1903, “These wretched 
abodes are menacing to both health and morals. They are the breeding spots from which 
issue the discontents and heartburnings that sometimes spread like a contagion through 
certain ranks of our laboring element.”24 Slum housing became the social reformers’ 
personal crusade. 
 Instead of improving housing, however, reformers defined disease in terms of 
race and poverty in order to justify racial containment as an effective strategy to combat 
contagion. Reformers believed the poor, whom they labeled black, were carriers of 
tuberculosis, typhus and other diseases (all of which poor blacks had in disproportionate 
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numbers). Thus, blacks were labeled a degenerating race with a high mortality rate, low 
birth rate and no future. Segregation of black residents was then justified as a means of 
quarantining disease and protecting the healthy white population. City slums were 
blamed for vice, crime, poverty and anarchy; thus, it followed that improved housing 
conditions would cure the ills of society.  
 The reform agenda was put on hold, however, as the Great Baltimore Fire raged 
through the city on Sunday, February 7 and Monday, February 8, 1904. The fire 
destroyed almost all of downtown Baltimore, spreading across 140 acres and destroying 
over 1,500 buildings. The burnt district corresponded roughly to the original sixty acres 
of Baltimore Town. The city launched immediate relief efforts though fortunately there 
were no deaths, few injuries and few were left homeless. Physically the city was rebuilt 
much as it was before. The only major changes were the widening of Pratt and Light 
Streets along the present-day inner harbor. Out of the rubble however, emerged one 
major change to Baltimore: a sewer system. The Baltimore Fire turned out to be a 
blessing in disguise as the combined efforts of rebuilding the streets, sewer construction, 
and laying a high-pressure water system and electrical channels meant new planning 
concepts. 25  
 The Great Baltimore Fire also heightened awareness on living conditions, which 
helped dictate steps for recovery. Before the fire, in 1903, the Baltimore Association for 
the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor and the Charity Organization Society 
appointed a special committee to assess housing conditions in Baltimore City. The Great 
Baltimore Fire of 1904 only reinforced their conviction that such a study was necessary.26 
In 1907 the study was published with Janet Kemp, a member of the Federated Charities 
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who conducted and compiled surveys for the study, as the primary author. The study was 
designed to improve housing conditions in Baltimore due to the belief that “It had long 
been known by those familiar with the alley [districts] of Baltimore, and with the section 
occupied by our rapidly increasing foreign populations, that conditions existed in those 
neighborhoods that could not but be detrimental to the welfare of their residents.”27 
Initially, then, the study did not give these conditions a race. The study was concerned 
with overcrowding, poor ventilation, lack of natural light, and ineffective sanitation.  
The study entitled Housing Conditions in Baltimore City selected four districts for 
study; two were described as tenement2 districts and two were described as alley districts. 
The tenement districts were located on the east side of the city – one occupied by Russian 
Jews near Albermarle Street (See Appendix 27), and the other by Poles in present day 
Fells Point along Thames Street (See Appendix 26).28 The two alley districts were located 
on the west side and were occupied primarily by blacks and some white German families. 
One of the alley districts, bounded by Biddle and Preston Street, Druid Hill and 
Pennsylvania Avenue (See Appendix 26), contained two hundred and fifteen 
overcrowded houses with two hundred and seventy apartments.29 These homes differed 
from tenements because they were not designed to function as separate apartments. 
Instead, families crowded together in individual bedrooms and living spaces. These two 
or three story high buildings were severely overcrowded, dark, dirty and dilapidated. The 
second alley district, called the Hughes Street district (See Appendix 25), was stratified 
                                                
2 These areas were described as “tenement” districts because three or more families 
occupied many of the homes as opposed to “alley” districts, which were characterized by 
houses crowded together on narrow streets. Homes in alley districts also frequently held 
more than one family however they were not designed to do so.  
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economically and socially.30 Hughes Street alone contained 120 homes with connecting 
alleys and courts.31 The neighborhood was a filthy slum. Animal feces and garbage lined 
the streets, cesspools overflowed into the streets. Cholera and typhoid were of the highest 
threat in the Biddle Alley neighborhood. According to Kemp’s research there was not one 
house on Biddle Alley in which there had not been at least one case of tuberculosis.32  
Kemp’s study unabashedly linked slum conditions with race. She referred to the 
residents of alley districts as “shiftless, irresponsible alley dwellers” citing a never-ending 
circulation of beer, a prevalence of gambling and cocaine habits to this end.33 In the 
Hughes Street district Kemp asserted, “many people seemed to have reached the bottom 
level of degeneracy.”34 Kemp believed the “squalor and wretchedness” which 
characterized the Hughes and Biddle Street alley districts were symptoms of the low 
standards and absence of ideals she believed the black residents exhibited. 
 The report suggested changes that differed for tenements as compared to alley 
houses. For the tenement districts, Kemp proposed a “market” solution based on race. 
Kemp’s proposal for white tenement districts would force landlords to improve existing 
tenements and require builders to construct model tenements according to regulations 
restricting height, regulating light, ventilation and water, requiring separate toilets for 
each apartment, and annual inspections. Kemp’s proposal to reform the black alley 
districts, on the other hand, was far less accommodating. Kemp observed that “low 
standards and the absence of ideals” were to blame for the conditions among the alley 
districts.35 The report proposed to reduce density in existing alley houses, to condemn 
those that were uninhabitable, ban sleeping in basements, and to prohibit the erection of 
additional alley houses.36 Though the suggestions would improve the quality of housing, 
18 
they would reduce the quantity. In essence, Kemp was suggesting legislation to isolate 
black neighborhoods in order to protect the white community from crime and disease that 
she argued would ‘logically’ follow black in-migration. In the end, the city took no action 
on the Housing Conditions in Baltimore report but the links Kemp made between race 
and urban space would continue to guide public policy in the Baltimore. The north and 
west black neighborhoods continued to grow in population and size, gradually becoming 
the worst slums in the city.  
 Slowly Baltimore’s black districts began to expand in population and in size. 
Between 1900 and 1910 the population of blacks increased from 80,000 to 85,000. The 
western boundary of the black district extended six blocks from Argyle Avenue to 
Gilmore Street. By 1910, over 15% of the city’s total black population, 12,738, crowded 
into the 17th ward of the city. Expansion of the black population was not without incident. 
When a black family moved into a home on Stricker Street, located along the western 
boundary of black residence, they were attacked and their house was stoned.37 Blacks 
were unsuccessful in their attempts to move eastward past the boundary of Druid Hill 
Avenue until the summer of 1910 when George F. McMechen and his family moved onto 
the 1800 block of McCulloh Street. 
 On June 9, 1910 Margaret G. Franklin Brewer sold 1834 McCulloh Street to W. 
Ashbie Hawkins. The Baltimore Sun, attempting to back up assertions that blacks 
destroyed property values, claimed Hawkins had paid only $800 for the house whose 
previous value was said to be $2,400. However, according to court records Hawkins 
obtained at $1,900 mortgage for the house issued by the Ridgley Building Association.38 
Hawkins was a prominent lawyer who had been a leader in the Niagara Movement, 
19 
which was founded by W.E.B. DuBois in 1905 to oppose Booker T. Washington’s 
policies of racial accommodation, or what some called subordination. Hawkins became 
involved in Niagara’s successor organization the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, four years later. Hawkins’ work eventually led to the 
formation of the NAACP’s legal department. Three weeks after Hawkins moved into 
what had been a predominantly white neighborhood the Baltimore Sun published the 
news with the headline claiming the city was under a “negro invasion,”39 Hawkins was 
after all a black man encroaching upon one of the most fashionable neighborhoods in 
Baltimore. Nearby Eutaw Place was home to Johns Hopkins University president Daniel 
Coit Gilman, Dr. William Stewart Halstead, the father of American surgery, and the 
future president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson.40  
 After purchasing the home, Hawkins rented it to his law partner George W. F. 
McMechen, a Yale Law graduate, his wife and children. “We did not move up there 
because we wished to force our way among the whites,” McMechen told the New York 
Times, “association with them in a social way would be just as distasteful to us as it 
would be to them. We merely desired to live in more commodious and comfortable 
quarters.”41 White neighbors reacted violently. They threw stones at McMechen’s door 
and windows, dumped tar on the steps and threw bricks through the skylights. Only 
Arthur B. Rice and Irwin School, both nine-year-old boys living next door in the 1700 
block of McCulloh Street, were caught. They were fined one dollar each.42 McMechen’s 
presence in what is now considered Bolton Hill prompted whites to form the McCulloh 
Street-Madison Avenue Protective Association. The Association resolved, “…colored 
people should not be allowed to encroach on some of the best residential streets in the 
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city and force white people to vacate their homes.”43 On July 5, 1910 a petition was 
prepared requesting the Mayor and City Council to, “take some measures to restrain the 
colored people from locating in a white community, and proscribe a limit beyond which 
it shall be unlawful for them to go…”44  
 The McCulloh Street-Madison Avenue Protective Association’s desire for racial 
segregation was consistent with increased segregation throughout Baltimore City and the 
greater United States. Plessy vs. Ferguson established the doctrine of “separate but equal” 
in 1896. Segregated housing already existed in many northern cities including Boston and 
New York. Between 1907 and 1910 blacks began to be excluded from public parks, 
theaters and hotels. Racial tolerance in department stores ended in Baltimore in 1910 as 
more and more stores restricted blacks from trying on garments and prohibiting them 
from returning clothing.45 Tensions in the McCulloh Street neighborhood escalated. 
White resident M.Z. Hammen crossed the street to taunt Willam B. Hamer, a black postal 
worker who had moved into the neighborhood because he wanted to rent a better house. 
Hamer responded to Hammen, “I am as good as you are. You move on or I brain you 
with this chair.”46 Hammen sought legal action but was informed by the magistrate that 
Hamer had committed no crime since he merely threatened bodily harm. “The fact that he 
is an undesirable neighbor,” explained the magistrate, “does not constitute a crime.”47   
Milton Dashiell and Samuel L. West, two democratic City Council members, 
recognized the growing debate surrounding residential segregation and its potential as a 
potent political issue. William L. Marbury, a leading lawyer and resident of Bolton Hill, 
volunteered his services as a legal advisor to Dashiell and West. Together, the three 
drafted the first bill introduced to City Council intended to freeze existing racial housing 
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patterns and prevent blacks from further encroaching on white neighborhoods. The 
ordinance thus hemmed blacks into the alley districts and slum neighborhoods they 
already occupied by legally preventing them from occupying streets with white residents.   
Ordinance 610 became a municipal policy intending to preserve order, secure property 
values and promote the great interests and inuring the good government of Baltimore 
City. I will quote the ordinance at length: 
…it shall be unlawful for any white person to move into or begin to occupy as a 
residence or as a place of public assembly any house, building or habitation 
within or upon that part of any street or alley way… within the City of 
Baltimore… if at the date of the passage of this said ordinance… shall contain a 
greater number of houses, buildings or habitations occupied as residences by 
negroes or colored people than it does houses, buildings or habitations occupied 
as residences by white people… it shall be unlawful for any negro or colored 
person to move into or begin to occupy as a residence or as a place of public 
assembly any house, building or habitation within or upon that part of any street 
or alley way… within the City of Baltimore… if at the date of the passage of this 
said ordinance… shall contain a greater number of houses, buildings or 
habitations occupied as residences by white people than it does houses, buildings 
or habitations occupied as residences by negroes or colored people.48 
 
The ordinance stipulated that violating any of these provisions would result in a fine of 
$100 or confinement in the Baltimore City Jail for not less than thirty days, nor more than 
twelve months, or a combination of both. Furthermore nothing provided in the ordinance 
should affect the white or Negro or colored residents, or the location of their residences, 
previous to the passage of the ordinance.  
 Mayor J. Barry Mahool issued an explanation of the ordinance to the New York 
times explaining, “the reasons leading up to this so called segregation ordinance have 
been going on in the City of Baltimore for the past ten years.” Reflecting on Baltimore’s 
unique situation as both Northern and Southern Mayor Mahool explained, “In the Far 
South the Negroes would never dream of pushing their way into the white residential 
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districts… In the North and West the Negro population is comparatively small… [in such 
cities] there are not enough negroes to make it rise to the dignity of a problem.” Mayor 
Mahool blamed black residents of Baltimore for “pushing up” into a neighborhood of 
white residence, “… it is clear that one of the first desires of a negro, after he acquires 
money and property, is to leave his less fortunate brethren and nose into the 
neighborhood of the white people.”49 Though Mahool claimed the ordinance was not 
directed toward the black race as a whole, it is clear through his justification of the 
ordinance that it was specifically aimed at regulating black upward mobility.  
 City Solicitor Edgar Allan Poe issued an opinion supporting the ordinance and 
declaring it constitutional based upon the state’s police power, “… [because] of 
ineradicable traits of character peculiar to the races, close association on a footing of 
absolute equality is utterly impossible between them, wherever negroes exist in large 
numbers in a white community, and invariably leads to irritation, friction, disorder and 
strife.”50 Poe continued his justification explaining, “a state has the right under its police 
power to require the separation of the two races wherever the failure to so separate them 
injuriously affects the good order and welfare of the community.”51 From these series of 
events came the first residential segregation ordinance in the United States. 
 The emergence of a segregation ordinance in Baltimore quickly became a national 
story. The New York Times proclaimed “nothing like it can be found in any statute book 
or ordinance record of this country… it is unique in legislation, Federal, State or 
municipal – an ordinance so far-reaching in the logical sequence that must result from its 
enforcement that it may be said to mark a new era in social legislation.”52 The Times 
noted that while this was not a new departure in legislation, numberless acts already 
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existed providing the segregation of blacks and whites in street cars, schools and other 
public places, the Baltimore ordinance was unique because it applied to all areas without 
regard to the character of the space. While existing legislation was temporary in its effect 
on black citizens, Baltimore’s legislation was permanent. The New York Times refrained 
from evaluating the ordinance critically or positively, instead the article aimed to show 
how radically different Baltimore’s legislation was from existing segregation laws. With 
increasing national attention, Baltimore became the national leader in residential 
segregation and the first city to sign residential segregation into law. Richmond, Norfolk, 
Roanoke, and Portsmouth in Virginia passed similar legislation, as did Winston-Salem in 
North Carolina, Greenville in South Carolina, Birmingham in Alabama, Atlanta in 
Georgia, Louisville in Kentucky, St. Louis in Missouri, Oklahoma City in Oklahoma, 
New Orleans in Louisiana, Indianapolis in Indiana, and Dallas in Texas.53 
  While it was clear that blacks would be opposed to such an ordinance, real estate 
brokers and white property owners in mixed neighborhoods joined them in opposition. 
Before the first ordinance was even passed Charles S. Otto, a Baltimore City property 
owner complained,  
I am also a property owner and I have a house i[sic] south Baltimore where one of 
the owners have rented the next two houses from mine to colored. My tenants are 
white. They tell me in spring they will move, now that this ordinance becomes a 
law and if white people don’t move in my house I will have to pay expenses on 
property that does not pay my [sic] in return. I approve in keeping colored people 
to themselves and this ordinance as it is will work a hardship on property owners 
all over the city. I would approve of a law where there is no colored people in the 
block.54 
 
This protest predicted future methods of residential segregation in the form of 
blockbusting. White property owners were often scared into selling their property to 
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black tenants for fear of decreasing property values attributed to black residency by 
newspapers and real estate agents hoping to capitalize on white racism and prejudice. 
Only a few days earlier, The Afro-American published an article refuting the notion that 
black occupation reduced property values. The article stated, “many properties in the City 
of Baltimore were enhanced in value by the occupancy of colored people…we were just 
told last week by a real estate man that he has emptied a whole block of houses occupied 
by white people who would not pay their rent, and put in colored tenants at a larger 
rent…” The article firmly asserted, “real estate men are opposed to the West Segregation 
Ordinance and it is needless to say we likewise.”55  
Baltimore’s segregation ordinance underwent several changes throughout its 
seven-year life span. Mayor Mahool signed a second draft of the ordinance on April 7, 
1911 after Judge Harland and Duffy of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore declared the 
ordinance ineffective and void because it was “inaccurately drawn”.56 There is no 
published report of the Judges opinions but presumably the inaccuracy referenced was 
located in the ordinance’s title. Section 221 of the City Charter of Baltimore provided, 
“Every ordinance enacted by the City shall embrace but one subject which shall be 
described in its title…” The title of the first segregation ordinance did not meet this 
requirement. The ordinance declared the provision was, “an ordinance for preserving 
order, security property values and promoting the great interests and insuring the good 
government of Baltimore City,” without mentioning racial segregation of housing or 
excluding black servants from the law so that they could live in white homes and work.57  
The second version of the ordinance was revised to include the provision that black 
servants were not prohibited from living with employers, and that all applications for 
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permits to erect residential property must specify whether for white or colored persons 
and the applications must be published in the newspapers for two weeks to permit 
investigation.58 The third version of the ordinance added the provision that neither black 
schools nor black churches could be established on white blocks and vice versa. Mayor 
Mahool signed the third version on May 15, 1911.  
Two years later, a criminal indictment was filed against John E. Gurry, “a colored 
person”, for unlawfully moving into a residence on an all white block. The Criminal 
Court of Baltimore dismissed the indictment against Gurry, finding the ordinance 
illogical. Judge Elliott concluded that the ordinance would depopulate mixed blocks by 
precluding blacks and whites from moving there since section one of the ordinance 
excluded whites from blocks “in whole or in part black” and section two excluded blacks 
from blocks “in whole or in part white.”59 The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed this 
judgment believing that either blacks or whites could move onto mixed blocks because 
the ordinance excludes blacks from blocks “in whole or in part” residential, in which all 
residences were occupied by whites. However, the Maryland Court found the ordinance 
unconstitutional because it took away the vested rights of the owner of a dwelling to 
move into it if he happened to be white and the block was all black or vice versa.60 Thus, 
the segregation ordinance proved difficult to enforce without divulging citizens of the 
ability to live in a property they owned. Though the Maryland Court did not strike down 
the ordinance on the basis of the right to property, this decision’s focus on the right of the 
property owner indicated the basis upon which segregation ordinances would ultimately 
be held unconstitutional across the nation.  
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Despite this minor set back, the Baltimore City Council had a fourth segregation 
ordinance prepared by the time the Maryland Court of Appeals signed the paperwork 
striking down the third version of the ordinance. The fourth version, signed on September 
25, 1913 provided: 
... that nothing herein contained shall be construed or operate to prevent any 
person, who at the date of the passage of this ordinance, shall have acquired a 
legal right to occupy, as a residence and building or portion thereof…from 
exercising such legal right…61 
 
In rewording the ordinance to allow for property owners to occupy their property without 
regard to race, the Baltimore City council hoped to circumvent the issue of property 
rights that the ordinances blatantly violated.  
 The residential segregation ordinances of Baltimore City were originally justified 
as a public health initiative. Using Social Darwinism3, reformers argued that a quarantine 
on the black population deemed sick and unfit would help protect the healthy population. 
Ultimately, the public health justification for residential segregation proved to be flawed.  
The mortality rate among blacks from tuberculosis remained 260% higher than that of 
whites, and the overall death rate from all diseases was 96% higher than that of whites.62 
H.L. Mencken, a reporter for the Baltimore Sun from 1906-1948, commented on the 
segregation ordinance’s effect on public health: 
But who ever heard of a plan for decent housing for negroes in Baltimore? Most 
of them live in filthy hovels, crowded together in the winter, breeding diseases in 
themselves and constantly communicating these diseases to the rest of us. The 
persons who govern us have never thought to look to this matter… The law 
practically insists that he [the negro] keep incubating typhoid and tuberculosis – 
                                                
3 Social Darwinism is the nineteenth century theory of evolution that developed the idea 
of “survival of the fittest”. This theory goes on to explain that the hierarchy of races 
within society is a direct reflection of genetic differences along racial lines. Therefore 
dominant races are the “fittest” because they are genetically predisposed to superiority. 
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that he keep these infections alive… for the delight and benefit of the whole 
town.63 
 
Here Mencken reveals his usual critique of American life and culture and particularly, 
Baltimore City politics by commenting on the inability of Baltimore officials to “look 
into this matter.” Mencken openly criticizes the segregation ordinances and those who 
wrote them for insisting that “the negro keep incubating typhoid and tuberculosis” as the 
laws forced blacks to live in tight quarters in small neighborhoods around the city. 
Despite Mencken’s rampant racism, he established that containment does not enact health 
reform. Even the next Mayor James H. Preston conceded that the segregation ordinances 
failed to protect the health of the middle class, “The evil effects of the unhealthy state of 
the negro race are not confined within their own numbers… Regardless of our efforts to 
maintain [a] sanitary and healthful environment for ourselves and families the insidious 
influence of slum conditions is carried into our very midst to defile and destroy.”64 In 
short, the segregation ordinance failed under the guise of promoting public health and 
fighting disease and instead proved disastrous for Baltimore’s black community as a 
whole. 
 The ordinances limited the housing supply available to an increasing black 
population and allowed property owners to inflate prices based on supply and demand. 
By 1920, Baltimore’s total population had grown to 733,826 - 108,696 of which were 
black. Though the ordinances did not seem to limit black housing opportunities on their 
face, circumstances conspired to decrease the amount of homes available to black 
residents citywide. Prospective black homeowners generally had a more difficult time 
acquiring the loans necessary to purchase their own homes. Though building and loan 
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associations existed, many refused to extend credit to black residents. According to 
census figures from 1910, which show homeownership among blacks in 73 southern 
cities with a black population of 5,000 or more, Baltimore ranked 72. Only 933 of the 
city’s 85, 098 blacks owned their homes.65 Thus, limited supply and increased demand 
for homes led to rising prices. Speculators often acquired homes and then converted them 
into tenements for three or more families. Thus, black residents had no choice but to 
crowd together in order to make rent.   
 In 1915 W. Ashbie Hawkins, the first black resident to purchase a home in 
Baltimore in a white residential neighborhood, filed a challenge on behalf of the local 
NAACP chapter that reached the Maryland Court of Appeals. The court delayed a 
decision, pending the outcome of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of 
a Louisville law modeled on Baltimore’s segregation ordinances. The Supreme Court 
case was a product of a test case created by the NAACP to highlight the ordinance’s 
unconstitutionality. The scenario involved William Warley, president of the Louisville 
branch of the NAACP, and his attempt to buy a corner lot from white real estate agent 
Charles Buchanan. The lot was in a white block but surrounded by black residents. The 
contract arranged between Warley and Buchanan stated that Warley was not required to 
complete his half of the bargain “unless I have the right under the laws of the State of 
Kentucky and the City of Louisville to occupy said property as a residence.”66 The 
NAACP wanted to create a situation of role reversal whereby the white real estate agent 
was the one challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. As anticipated, Buchanan 
sought fulfillment of the contract in the state courts and Warley used the ordinance as his 
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excuse for not fulfilling.  The state court ruled the Louisville ordinance constitutional and 
therefore a valid excuse for Warley.  
 Three U.S. Supreme Court cases that had been previously decided led to the logic 
for the US Supreme Court case of Buchanan v. Warley to succeed. First, in 1896 the 
Supreme Court ruled separate but equal was constitutional in Plesssy v. Fergeson 
effectively approving of Jim Crow laws. Thus, Plessy v. Fergeson allowed Baltimore’s 
segregation laws because the ordinances did not reflect or specifically relegate black 
residents to substandard or unequal housing. In 1908 the Court found the state of 
Kentucky had the power to require racial segregation in a private college in Berea 
College v. Kentucky. During this same era the Court had actively supported the credo of 
“laissez-faire” in Lochner v. New York in 1905. In this decision the Court protected the 
freedom of contract in the baking business from maximum-hour legislation. Lochner in 
particular supported the rights of citizens to pursue private business transactions free 
from state intervention. Thus, the NAACP hoped to appeal to the Court’s support of 
business and protect Buchanan’s right to engage in private real estate transactions without 
interference from the State of Louisville.  
Buchanan v. Warley reached the Supreme Court in April of 1916. The Baltimore 
City solicitor filed a brief supporting Louisville’s right to prevent a black from buying on 
a white block, while Hawkins filed a brief opposing Louisville’s segregation law.67 On 
November 5, 1917 the US Supreme Court overturned the ordinance on the basis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of due process, “nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”68 The court ruled that a colored 
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person had the right to acquire property without state legislation discriminating against a 
person solely because of their color. Justice Day’s opinion found, “the difficult problem 
arising from a feeling of race hostility” insufficient for depriving citizens of their 
constitutional rights to acquire and use property without state legislation discriminating 
against them on the basis of race.69 The court distinguished the ordinance from other 
segregation laws because it destroyed the right of the individual to “acquire, enjoy and 
dispose of his property” and was thus opposed to the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Though the ordinance was discriminating on the basis of race, in the end it 
was overturned due to the universal guarantee of right to property within the United 
States.  
The black community celebrated Buchanan v. Warley across the nation. In 
Baltimore, the Afro-American said, “The joy in Bunkville when home run Casey came to 
bat in the final inning of a famous game with the bases loaded is nothing compared with 
the rejoicing in Baltimore, Richmond, St. Louis and other Southern towns over the 
outcome of the Louisville Segregation decision.”70 The decision in Buchanan v. Warley 
should have represented great strides for the black community in the realm of residential 
segregation. The Afro-American optimistically predicted, “colored folk will not be 
restricted to these sections, that they may hold property where they please, and live in any 
property that they own.”71 However the end of the segregation ordinances did not mean 
the end of state sanctioned segregation in Baltimore City.  
Though Baltimore’s experiment with legal apartheid was short lived, the 
residential segregation ordinances were only the first instance of institutionalized 
residential segregation in Baltimore. In the next hundred years, Baltimore City politicians 
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enforced residential segregation in de jure and de facto ways. Baltimore’s urban 
landscape today is characterized by the segregationist practices of public officials and 
private residents. One hundred years later one can see the lasting effects on both the 
physical landscape and the social consciousness of Baltimore City and its residents. The 
end of residential segregation ordinances did not mean an end to segregation in Baltimore 
City. The respite and joy felt by black residents after Buchanan v. Warely was short lived 
as city officials and private residents immediately embarked on a one hundred year long 
crusade to maintain and implement further means of residential segregation. 
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Chapter 3 
Public and Private Partnerships in Residential Segregation 
  
 
 The end of racial zoning did not mean the end of residential segregation in the 
city of Baltimore. Government initiatives and collective private action replaced 
Baltimore’s residential segregation laws with the same intention of segregating white and 
black residents. In 1918 Baltimore City’s boundaries expanded to the north, east and west 
(See Appendix 31). Between 1920 and 1930 housing construction peaked at 6,000 homes 
per year, most of them in the newly acquired territory giving the burgeoning middle class 
a place to flee a rapidly aging housing stock in the inner city. As Baltimore’s black 
population swelled, the boundaries of the segregated black community hardly expanded 
at all, accentuating the desperate situation of housing for Baltimore’s black residents. 
Baltimore public officials and civic leaders sought to maintain the silent conspiracy that 
was residential segregation through official and unofficial means.  
Mayor Preston was undaunted by the abolition of Baltimore’s segregation 
ordinances. Preston sought advice from Dr. A.K. Warner of Chicago where plans to keep 
blacks out of white territory were well under way. The Chicago Plan sought to “force out 
blacks already residing in [white] neighborhoods and [to ensure] that no others entered. 
The activities of [the white property owners’ association] consisted both of mass 
meetings to arouse the neighborhood residents against the blacks and publications in 
white journals of scathing denunciations of race.”72 This plan banded together public 
officials, private institutions and white residents of Baltimore to combine de jure 
segregation with de facto segregation. Slum clearance, restrictive covenants, redlining, 
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and blockbusting set the stage for the federal public housing agenda to become the 
primary vehicle for residential segregation in Baltimore City beginning in the 1930s. 
The first test of Preston’s plan came in August of 1918. Through an anonymous 
letter sent to the Mayor’s office Mayor Preston became aware that Louis Buckner, owner 
of a house on Lee Street, proposed to rent the second floor of his three story home to 
blacks in an all white neighborhood. Buckner promptly received a visit by the Secretary 
of the Real Estate Board of Baltimore and the Inspector of Buildings for Baltimore. 
Buckner was told that if the rental went through he would be cited for any code 
violations. Buckner relented and promised not to rent to blacks.73 City building inspectors 
and health department officials would cite code violations to those renting or selling to 
blacks in white neighborhoods. Thus, the conspiracy of residential segregation seeped 
into the inner workings of Baltimore City’s local government. 
In addition to pursuing the Chicago Plan, Mayor Preston planned to use 
condemnation as a land-acquisition tool to pursue racial segregation. As a pioneer of 
Baltimore’s first government sponsored Negro removal project, Mayor Preston targeted 
the area north of City hall for his a strategic “parking” initiative. The city began in 1914 
to buy up properties that were used as rooming houses and cheap flats along St. Paul and 
Courtland Streets between Lexington and Centre Streets. Under the guise of beautifying 
the city, Mayor Preston cleared notorious sections of poor black neighborhoods that 
surrounded the downtown business district.74 Three churches, the old headquarters of the 
Afro-American newspaper, and the rented law office of W. Ashbie Hawkins and George 
McMechen (known for their part in opposing the segregation ordinances) were all 
destroyed.  A park was created in the middle of bifurcated St. Paul Street and named after 
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Preston. In 1917, after Preston Garden’s construction had begun, the Mayor declared that 
health concerns justified the relocation of blacks on a faster scale and the creation of the 
park.  Preston proposed “the elimination of certain congested sections, populated by 
Negroes, in which has been noted a very high percentage of deaths from…communicable 
diseases…”75 He noted that the quarantine of black citizens would occur in order to 
protect the health of white citizens as blacks constituted a menace to the health of the 
white population.76 This was the second time in Baltimore’s segregation narrative that 
public health concerns were used to justify residential segregation. When the project was 
completed in 1919, some called it Preston’s Folly, others called it Preston Gardens as it is 
still known today.77 
Slum clearance began as an end in and of itself to eliminate dilapidated black 
neighborhoods throughout Baltimore City. It then blossomed into an integral facet of the 
public housing agenda with the passage of the Housing Act of 1940 and finally facilitated 
urban renewal through the Federal Housing Act of 1954. The idea of slum clearance was 
not new to Baltimore City. W.W. Emmart first suggested slum clearance in Baltimore in 
1911 in his speech to the first City-Wide Congress. Emmart advocated the demolition of 
poor black residential neighborhoods in order to protect “better neighborhoods” and in 
the process attack “blight”, defined by overcrowded homes, impoverished residents, 
substandard sanitation and high incidence of disease, as a general phenomenon.78 Emmart 
depicted the cure to “blight”, a term that was equated with black areas of residence, as 
clearance without community development,  
The northwest section of Baltimore while in many ways the most desirable for 
residential purposes has been steadily depreciating. This condition should not be 
allowed to continue, when, by clearing out and replanning certain undesirable 
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neighborhoods; the opening up of wide boulevards connecting together the 
various parks or ‘squares’ of that section with Eutaw Place, a doubling of real 
estate values would justify the cost and the increased taxable basis would without 
doubt leave a margin of profit.79  
 
Emmart’s keynote address set the stage for a slum clearance agenda, which ultimately 
destroyed several of the cities worst slums displacing hundreds of black residents without 
offering them another place to live. Slum clearance would be revisited when federal 
funds were made available to Baltimore through the creation of public housing for the 
nation’s poor in the 1930s and 1940s. 
In the 1920’s city officials began investigating the possibility of clearing the Lung 
Block – an area of the city notorious for its high concentration of tuberculosis and black 
residence. The Federated Charities, through its Colored Board of the Western District, 
drew up plans for the clearance of the area in 1913. The Urban League also surveyed the 
Lung Block and pushed for the redevelopment project. After the survey, four square 
blocks of houses were torn down and replaced by a whites-only school.80 Hundreds of 
families were displaced by this slum clearance project though no plans were made to 
provide alternate housing in other neighborhoods. 
 If Baltimore City officials could conspire to enforce segregation, why couldn’t 
private citizens join the cause? The tactics used by city officials inspired private citizens 
to adopt their own means of residential segregation – racially restrictive covenants. 
Restrictive covenants were legal obligations imposed on the deeds of real estate imposed 
by the seller upon the buyer to do or not to do something. Racially restrictive covenants 
would require that only members of a certain race would occupy the property. As part of 
a national trend, residents of Baltimore City banded together through neighborhood 
36 
associations to draft agreements baring blacks from moving into their neighborhoods. 
Though the government was not a part of the drafting of these agreements, their 
constitutionality was upheld until the 1948 U.S. Supreme Court case Shelly v. Kraemer. 
Homeowners and developers attached restrictive covenants to the deeds of homes 
especially in the North and Northwest regions of the city. Such covenants hemmed black 
residents into specific neighborhoods and prevented them from out-migration. The 
housing development of Guilford to the north of the city explained, “At no time shall the 
land included in said tract or any part thereof or any building erected thereon be occupied 
by any Negro or person of Negro extraction.”81 Nearby Roland Park prided itself on 
building restrictive covenants into the deeds of all the homes it built thus creating 
Baltimore’s first homogenous community of upper class white residents. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the legality of restrictive covenants in 
1938 in Meade v. Dennistone, often referred to as the NAACP’s attempt to “sue Jim 
Crow out of Maryland with the Fourteenth Amendment.”82 In 1936 Edmond D. Meade, a 
young black pastor, signed a contract to buy a house at 2227 Barclay Street in Baltimore. 
Mary Estelle Dennistone, owner of 2221 Barclay Street and Mary J. Becker, owner of 
2234 Barclay Street, along with fifteen other property owners along the 2200 block of 
Barclay Street signed an agreement on November 14, 1927 stating that  
neither the said respective property nor any of them nor any part of them or any of 
them shall be at anytime occupied or used by any negro or negroes or person or 
persons either in whole or in part of negro or African descent except only that 
negro or persons of negro or African descent either in whole or in part may be 
employed as servants by any of the owners or occupants of said respective 
properties and as and whilst so employed may reside on the premises occupied by 
their respective employers...83 
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The covenant applied to an area of twenty-four square blocks and included the house in 
question. Dennistone and her neighbors hired the by now familiar William L. Marbury, 
one of the collaborators of the original segregation ordinances, to file suit on their behalf 
in an effort to restrain Meade and his family from moving in. Charles Houston of the 
NAACP took on Meade’s case and provoked the suit, hoping the case would allow him to 
attack racial discrimination. Meade asserted that this contract denied him equal protection 
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Ultimately the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the use of racially restrictive 
covenants drawing upon the precedents set by Plessy v. Ferguson that separate but equal 
satisfied the conditions of equal protection and the Civil Rights Cases which forbade 
public, but not private discrimination.84 The Court asserted through preceding cases that 
the constitutionality of restrictive covenants was within the power of the state and thus 
covenants were protected. The use of racially restrictive covenants would continue until 
1948. In Shelley v. Kraemer the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the use of restrictive 
covenants holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state from enforcing 
restrictive covenants that would prohibit a person from owning or occupying property 
based on race or color.85  
While America was in the throes of the Great Depression, President Roosevelt 
introduced a practice that would alter perceptions of race, religion and national origin in 
American cities. The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) began mapping 239 
cities dividing and color-coding neighborhoods according to their perceived risk in terms 
of mortgage loan security. These maps were not enforced by the state but used by 
banking institutions to determine the distribution of loans and mortgages. Factors 
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included age and condition of housing alongside race, ethnicity, class, religion, economic 
status of residents and the overall homogeneity of the neighborhood. These factors were 
organized into a racial hierarchy of economic risk. “Redlining”, as it was commonly 
known, added a cartographic dimension to residential segregation and discrimination. 
Neighborhoods were to be classified by color – green indicted best, blue indicted still 
desirable, yellow indicated a definitely declining neighborhood and red meant 
“detrimental influences in a pronounced degree, undesirable population or an infiltration 
of it.”86 On these maps all white neighborhoods were colored green while all black 
neighborhoods were literally color coded as red, giving economic security a racial 
complexion. By labeling predominantly black neighborhoods as undesirable, the federal 
government encouraged stereotypes that dictated housing opportunities for black 
residents across the United States. 
 Baltimore’s mapping began shortly after the opening of the HOLC’s Baltimore 
office on July 24, 1933. The agency sternly warned appraisers to document “infiltrations 
of lower-grade population or different racial groups,” into white neighborhoods, with this 
example, “Negro – rapid.”87 These colored maps guided mortgage lenders in assessing 
which residents or neighborhoods were risky or sound investments. Thus, a two-tiered 
lending system was born where white residents could obtain loans from banks while 
black citizens were forced to get their financing from speculators. By forcing black 
residents to obtain loans from a less formal or regulated lending market, black residents 
were subject to the whims of greedy speculators, eager to take advantage of vulnerable 
buyers by charging increased rates.  
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Discrimination was not limited to race. Nationalities were rated based on their 
real estate desirability according to a system of hierarchy developed by John Usher 
Smyth, a zoning activist. English, Germans, Scots, Irish and Scandinavians were rated at 
the top of the list while Russian Jews of the lower class were ranked number seven and 
Negroes number nine.88 Though it was acknowledged that some whites might move up in 
the ranks, black residents had no chance. Homer Hoyt, leader of the HOLC, stated, “If the 
entrance of a colored family into a white neighborhood causes a general exodus of white 
people, such dislikes are reflected in property values.”89 
 Most of inner city Baltimore – stretching one mile north and south from City Hall 
and two miles to the east and west – was redlined as hazardous for conventional 
lending.90 The McCulloh Street row houses, now completely inhabited by black residents, 
were within this area as were the homes on Eutaw Place and the neighborhood of Bolton 
Hill. All of the black neighborhoods throughout Baltimore were redlined with the 
exception of Wilson Park and Morgan Park, which were rated blue due to their 
surrounding white neighborhoods (See Appendix 1).91 
 By the late 1930s the HOLC was absorbed into the Federal Housing 
Administration. While the FHA in effect invented the modern mortgage system and 
guaranteed loans to creditworthy borrowers it also institutionalized redlining by 
promoting homeownership in new, primarily suburban neighborhoods that were racially 
homogenous. Furthermore, the FHA recognized and adhered to restrictive covenants at 
times upholding covenants even after they had expired.  
 Redlining opened the door to another means used to both clear out and contain the 
black population of Baltimore: blockbusting. Real estate speculators often sought to 
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generate panic among white homeowners in neighborhoods on the cusp of change. They 
tried to convince people that there were black families moving into the neighborhood a 
consequence of which would be a decrease in property values. Speculators convinced 
white homeowners to sell before the value of their property was cut in half. Speculators 
would then advertise that house in only African American newspapers to get the first 
black family on a block that was all white. With the help of HOLC’s maps, classifying 
the desirability and value of homes in Baltimore’s neighborhoods based on race, real 
estate agents were able to capitalize on the panic of white homeowners. Furthermore, 
racially restrictive covenants allowed real estate agents to buy low and sell high. 
In such a tentative real estate market, real estate agents strategically sold or rented 
homes in less desirable, but still mostly white, neighborhoods to black families. Shortly 
after the first black residents moved into a borderline neighborhood, white residents 
panicked and moved out. Real estate speculators capitalized on the panic.  Brokers 
purchased whole blocks at a distressed price from nervous white sellers and sold at a 
premium to desperate black buyers. After a block was “busted” by the initial new 
residents, real estate agents helped to flip neighborhoods from white to black and profited 
off of vulnerable black buyers who were unable to obtain loans for housing any other 
way.  
 Baltimore real estate duo Manuel “Manning” Bernstein and Warren S. Shaw 
opened the Manning-Shaw Realty Company in 1953 under the premise of using 
blockbusting techniques. The black and white pair sought to break white neighborhoods 
and profit off of their blockbusting techniques.92 Westward expansion of the black 
community occurred because of blockbusting. Up until the mid 1940s the western 
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boundary of black residence was at Fulton Avenue. White residents occupied one side of 
the street and black residents occupied the other side. When the first black family crossed 
that boundary in 1944 the floodgates opened and the black community expanded 
westward with unprecedented speed. To be sure blockbusting was a strategy that came 
long after the advent of Federal Public Housing, but the role of public housing in shaping 
the racial landscape of Baltimore is so central that it deserves its own free standing 
discussion. 
Federal Public Housing was a cornerstone of the New Deal agenda of the 1930s, 
as a solution to the problems of the urban poor bred in slums. Social workers, municipal 
reformers and planners believed decent housing was the key to uplifting the urban poor. 
After President Roosevelt signed the National Industrial Recovery Act in June 1933, the 
Public Works Administration was organized under Secretary Ickes. Ickes established a 
Housing Division within the PWA to establish a federal housing program. The goals of 
the program were to relieve unemployment through jobs needed to build the projects, to 
furnish decent, sanitary dwellings to those whose incomes were so low that private 
capital was unable to provide adequate housing within their means, to clear or rehabilitate 
slum areas, and to demonstrate to the private sector the practicability of large-scale 
community planning.93 Despite good intentions, federal public housing was used as an 
instrument for the imposition of segregation throughout the United States, an example of 
which can be found in Baltimore City. The increase of racial residential segregation in 
Baltimore after the 1940s was due to a coordination of local city officials and federal 
government programs intending to sustain, increase and legitimate the residential 
separation of blacks and whites.  
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Site selection criteria was one of the primary vehicles through which federal 
public housing reinforced existing residential segregation patterns. In November 1939 the 
United States Housing Authority published site selection criteria in the Federal Register. 
These criteria were used for the next thirty years. The first criteria required “permanency 
of character” of the project meaning that the project should be built to last the length of 
the loan (sixty years) and that the site be appropriately positioned within the city as to 
withstand changing social patterns. Thus, planners were forced to study the effect of the 
project’s location on the city plan and the effect of the location within the city plan on the 
future of the project. Another consideration was the “sectional distribution of housing” 
which worked to divide the location of projects based on employment concentration, 
topographic barriers, and neighborhood preferences of racial groups. For example if a 
project served people of a particular race, job skill category or some other socioeconomic 
classification the USHA cautioned not to restrict their mobility within the metropolitan 
area by selecting an inappropriate site.94  
With respect to race the regulations stressed that “where it has been decided that a 
project should be built to serve families who are predominantly of a given race, care must 
be exercised in selecting a site which will not do violence to the preferences and 
established habits of members of that race or to the community of which they may be a 
part.”95 Thus, the federal government supported local authorities in using Federal Public 
Housing to further reinforce the separation of blacks and whites in Baltimore City.  
In August 1933 Governor Albert Ritchie appointed Abel Wolman, the State 
Health Department Engineer, to head Maryland’s State Advisory Committee to the Public 
Works Administration (PWA). In October 1933 Wolman created the Joint Committee on 
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Housing in Baltimore recommend sites for public housing locations. The committee was 
chaired by W. W. Emmart and comprised of planners, architects, and engineers, but not 
social workers or groups that represented the black residents of the areas discussed. 
Emmart later added Dr. Ivan E. McDougle, professor of sociology at Goucher College, to 
the committee. McDougle was regarded as an expert on race relations and the local black 
community though he embraced the doctrine of separate but equal in race relations. 
McDougle’s appointment sanctioned the doctrine of separate but equal in Baltimore’s 
housing program in the 1930s.96  
The Committee selected areas of study based on nine characteristics.4 First, the 
conditions of the dwellings were below a minimum standard for habitation, second, there 
was a loss of population due to unsatisfactory conditions, third, health and sanitary 
conditions were sub par, fourth, a declining tax return to the city, fifth, the proximity to 
better areas, sixth, accessibility to employment and inexpensive transportation, seventh, 
natural boundaries rendering the areas potentially self-sufficient and independent 
neighborhoods, eighth, public equipment of streets, schools, sewers, etc, and ninth, areas 
without probable future value except for dwelling use. The Committee balanced these 
characteristics to evaluate the desirability for rehabilitation of the areas studied.97 
African Americans living in extremely poor building conditions occupied area 1. 
It was described as compact and well bounded area with good transportation and 
churches. Health conditions in area 1 were poor as evidenced by the highest tuberculosis 
rate per assessed area. Population had decreased severely between 1900-1910. Despite 
                                                
4 The Report of the Joint Committee does not explicitly state where areas 1-9 are located 
within Baltimore City.  
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being occupied by black residents the Committee recommended the tract be reused for a 
white low rental group of clerical and technical employees. Area 2 was described as 
being in the “heart of the Negro belt of Baltimore” with 172 people per assessed acre in 
contrast to a city-wide average of 31.6.98 Despite overcrowding the neighborhood lost 
20% of its population between 1920 and 1930. The Joint Committee attributed this loss to 
the “decay of buildings beyond the point of even low level Negro occupancy” revealing 
their belief that black Baltimoreans tended to occupy dismal dwellings.99 Despite a 
negative assessment, the Joint Committee recommended this area be slated for Negro 
occupancy. This recommendation illustrates the fact that the Committee did not believe 
black neighborhoods were worthy of rehabilitation efforts. 
Area 3 was originally white except for alley houses however white evacuation of 
the neighborhood led white homes, some previously mansions, to be converted into 
colored tenements. This resulted in a depreciation of improvements, substandard health 
conditions and high rates of juvenile delinquency. However the Committee noted that the 
area was adjacent to many important public buildings and areas of commercial use. Thus, 
the Committee concluded the city was losing revenue through inefficient use of the area. 
This led the Committee to slate Area 3 for redevelopment as a neighborhood for upper 
class white residents. It continued, “There is no good reason… for it to be inhabited by 
colored people as they are incapable of paying the rentals…” The area should be 
reclaimed from a depopulated colored tenement district to an ideal residential 
neighborhood for white-collar employees.100  Again the Joint Committee was quick to 
slate an area with potential for white residence using words such as “reclaim” to press the 
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notion that black residents had no business residing in such an “ideal” residential 
neighborhood. 
Area 4 was described as naturally hemmed in by railroad traffic and automobile 
traffic. It was long ago abandoned by whites and replaced by three story dwellings 
packed with black families. The Police Department and Family Welfare Association 
reported bad social and health conditions in the area. Infant mortality was nearly twice 
the city-wide rate and tuberculosis was also markedly high. Due to already poor 
conditions and the natural hemming in of the neighborhood the Joint Committee deemed 
the neighborhood “certainly only useable for Negro habitation…”101 Area 5 was another 
naturally bound neighborhood with the lowest social and health conditions. The 
population was almost entirely black. Despite the fact that these conditions were quite 
similar to other areas of study, the Joint Committee concluded more data was necessary 
in order to decide what to do with the neighborhood. Finally, Area 6 was located in the 
oldest part of Baltimore with most of the homes over ninety years old. The area was not 
naturally inhabited by black residents but had been repopulated by black migrants. Area 6 
reported high infant mortality rates and the heaviest percentage of disease in the city as 
far as tuberculosis. Due to large streets fit for re-planning and the likelihood of an 
infiltration of industry this area too was slated for white redevelopment.102 
The recommendations of the Joint Committee clearly exhibit racist attitudes. Only 
areas so far condemned that they were not even remotely fit for white habitation were 
slated for black residence. Of the areas slated for black residence, no mention of 
rehabilitation or revitalization efforts was made. Most of the areas studied were 
recommended for rehabilitation so that white residents could move back in. Thus, 
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Baltimore City’s rehabilitation agenda was motivated and dictated by racial 
characteristics and favored white residents. 
The committee identified a number of factors that caused blight in Baltimore City. 
First, Baltimore’s land area had tripled during its last annexation in 1918 (See Appendix 
31). The city had spent its planning capacity and resources on the development of 
suburban areas within the annex. Second, planners in the 1920s had zoned a large area 
around the central business district as commercial with the assumption that the downtown 
would continue to expand. Instead, development of the annex, and industrial 
suburbanization in the early decades of the century had shifted development to the urban 
periphery. Third, the Great Depression worsened blight. When speculative owners were 
unable to collect rent from tenants on relief, they let their properties fall into tax 
delinquency. Finally, as the migration of blacks to Baltimore increased throughout the 
1910s and 1920s, the neighborhoods surrounding downtown Baltimore had become 
predominantly populated by black residents. White Baltimoreans effectively hemmed 
black residents into these areas by means of race restrictive covenants enforced to protect 
new white neighborhoods from encroachment.103 Additionally, Baltimore officials 
strategically placed public housing projects on the cusp of black and white neighborhoods 
to create natural barriers and further hem black residents into specific neighborhoods. 
The Baltimore Sun reported on the survey conducted by Emmart in an article 
written by P. Stewart Macaulay entitled, A Basis for a Baltimore City Plan: 
Recentralization of Population and Elimination of “Blighted” Areas. Macaulay reported 
that Baltimore had,  
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…expanded and flourished along her circumference and that, at the same time, 
she has been nourishing a rotten core. Suburbs have spread out on all sides, many 
of them springing up miles away from the heart of the city. And downtown, in the 
older sections, populations have been declining, houses have suffered from 
obsolescence and dilapidation and whole neighborhoods have been threatened 
with imminent abandonment.104  
 
The committee concluded that rehabilitation of such areas would restore property values 
and bring higher tax returns to the city of Baltimore.  
In March 1934 the Baltimore Urban League undertook a project to complete their 
own survey of The Negro Community of Baltimore. The goal of this study was to present 
a comprehensive picture of Negro life in Baltimore, ascertain the specific social needs of 
the community, and provide a factual basis for a constructive social program.105 The 
survey responded to the racial assumptions in Baltimore urban policy by reporting on 
questions of population, public health, employment, housing and crime within black 
residential areas in Baltimore City. 
First, the study addressed the issue of population. As of 1935 there were 
approximately 145,000 black Baltimore City residents. The ratio of whites to blacks 
remained constant in Baltimore City until 1920 when it increased five times as rapidly as 
the white population of the city.106 Contrasting later reports about in-migration of black 
residents from Southern states, the Urban League report believed most of Baltimore’s 
increase in black population was due to movement of black citizens from rural Maryland 
to the city.  
Employment was the second most important topic for the Urban League as the 
results of the survey helped explain the condition of black residents. The white 
population of Baltimore could be found working in the manufacturing and mechanical 
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industries while the black population worked primarily in domestic and personal service. 
Black and white residents competed for employment in the realm of industry where both 
were accepted for unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. In the area of domestic help, however, 
black residents dominated over available jobs. The Urban League found that nearly three-
fourths of the city’s female domestics, and more than half the males engaged in domestic 
service were black. Black residents were excluded from skilled crafts, white-collar work, 
and public service. Finally, the report classified an area of employment aptly called 
“racial service”, a field created by the automatic separation of the races, which included 
the public service group, separate public institutions and business establishments that 
catered to the black community’s needs i.e. beauticians, barbers, insurance, etc. This 
group provided employment for about 5,500 of a total population of 108,696 black 
Baltimore City residents.107  
The Urban League concluded that unemployment was one of the greatest 
obstacles black residents had to overcome in Baltimore City. Over forty percent of black 
families in Baltimore were receiving relief due to unemployment as compared to only 
thirteen percent of white families. Generally wages of black workers were lower than 
wages of white workers. Further exacerbating the issue was that blacks tended to be 
employed in the lowest paid and least skilled jobs.108 Low wages, higher rates of 
unemployment, and higher rents explained why, in 1934, the black community of 
Baltimore faced extreme economic hardships. This is further reflected in the inability of 
black residents to move out of blighted areas, as white residents were able to do.   
More than two thirds of Baltimore’s 33,000 black families lived in four of the 
city’s twenty wards.109 These statistics speak to the inability of blacks to migrate out of 
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the blighted neighborhoods to which they were confined due to segregation laws, 
restrictive covenants and an inability to afford or gain financing to buy a home. The 
Urban League believed that underlying the problem of housing for black Baltimore City 
residents was the fact that black residential areas tended to be areas of second-generation 
homes. Such areas frequently featured out of date homes that did not meet sanitary 
provisions. Although these homes were designed for the use of one family, given that 
thirty-three percent of all black families took lodgers (as compared to 24.2% of white 
families), their size was conducive to black families taking in more and more lodgers to 
help pay rent. Thus, these homes became rapidly overcrowded. The Urban League 
concluded that the solution for the problem of black housing is, “first of all, an adequate 
solution of city planning and housing reconstruction.”110 
The Urban League made a study of six housing areas covering a population of 
20,000, mostly occupied by black residents. The committee chose the six areas because 
they were “blighted” and because homes were beyond rehabilitation, population was 
declining, health and sanitary conditions were substandard, tax returns were low, and the 
areas generally had little future value except for dwelling purposes.111 The report found 
that Baltimore did not have “slum areas” but instead the central business district was 
ringed by blighted areas defined as such by, “a high percentage of tax delinquent property 
either occupied or unoccupied, on which repairs had not been made for a long period.”112  
The Urban League drew several conclusions about the condition of life for black 
residents of Baltimore City. Generally, the population of Baltimore per acre was 31.8. 
Within the areas studied the population per acre ranged from 87.3 to 172 indicating 
severe over crowding.113 The tuberculosis rate in these areas ranged from six to eleven 
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times the rate in the entire city and the infant mortality rate was 30 to 50 points higher 
supporting the claim that standards of public health were worse in black residential 
neighborhoods. As with the original segregation ordinances, the coincidence of black 
neighborhoods being targeted for slum clearance was justified by public health fears. 
Furthermore, the study showed that the crime rate in two of the six areas was 43.6 and 
24.9, as compared to the average city crime rate of 8.7.114 As other organizations 
previously, the Urban League too mislabeled the causes of residential segregation as the 
symptoms of “blight”.  
Summary paragraphs about each of the six areas studied are indicative of attitudes 
towards blacks in Baltimore and reveal differing standards of living conditions for the 
white and black residents of the city. Area 1, though primarily inhabited by black 
residents, was slated for re-use by a white low rental group. Due to the proximity of good 
schools, churches, shops and amusement centers for black residents Area 2 was slated for 
rehabilitation and occupancy by a somewhat higher income group. The Urban League 
believed Area 3 should be reclaimed from an uninhabited black tenement district to a 
residential neighborhood for white white-collar employees. Area 4 was deemed, “only 
useable for Negro habitation” due to heavy automobile traffic on either side creating a 
naturally “hemmed in” neighborhood. Area 5 was characterized as having very bad 
housing and poor social and health conditions. Area 6, according to the Urban League, 
was not naturally a black area but had been repopulated by black residents do to 
obsolescence. The League believed the black inhabitants in Area 6 should be evacuated 
from the area to make room for white families.115   
 The Urban League’s classification of each area reveals the attitudes of housing 
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planners toward black housing issues facing Baltimore City. Although black residents 
primarily inhabited all six areas, the Urban League planned to make three of them 
available for whites and two available to blacks. These three areas should be turned over 
to white residents and rebuilt, according to the Urban League, because of their proximity 
to public transportation and the desirability of their location.116 Only Area 2, where 
buildings were decaying was said to have, “no other value except for Negro residence 
and never will have,” and Area 4 which was, “certainly only usable for Negro habitation 
unless commerce and industry can absorb it, which seems doubtful,” were reserved for 
black residents.117 Thus, even though the Urban League acknowledged racism as the 
cause of blight they still conceded that salvageable neighborhoods should be given to 
white residents. 
The conclusions of the Urban League’s study of housing conditions reveal 
contrasting ideas about housing removal and rehabilitations based on race. The League 
did not hesitate to suggest that neighborhoods fit for white residence, but currently 
inhabited by black citizens, should be evacuated and turned over to whites. Thus clear 
priority was given to white residents over black and no thought was given or suggestion 
made as to where the displaced black residents should relocate. Even neighborhoods that 
had historically been inhabited by black residents like Area 3 were turned over to white 
residents because they had not deteriorated to the point that they were suitable for black 
residence. Furthermore, neighborhoods like Area 4 were deemed suitable for black 
residence solely on the basis that had natural barriers promoting segregation. The Urban 
League thus made no secret of their belief that areas that could be rehabilitated should be 
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returned to white use while neighborhoods that were deteriorated beyond repair should 
either be occupied by blacks or demolished entirely.  
“The Health of the Baltimore Negro is more than a matter of medicines, hospitals 
and doctors,” began the section of the study entitled Keeping Healthy, “It is intricately 
interwoven with the problems of economic security, literacy and cultural levels…”118 
Thus, while Urban League officials preserved quality land for white occupancy, these 
reformers also saw direct links between health, housing and structural racism. The 
mortality rate of black residents in 1934 was the same as that of white citizens twenty-
five years earlier. In 1933 the death rate among the black population of Baltimore City 
was 1,663 per 100,000 of the population, over a third higher than the white death rate. In 
1933 seven diseases – heart ailments, pneumonia, tuberculosis, nephritis, cerebral 
hemorrhage and softening of the brain, venereal disease and cancer – were the cause of 
71% of all deaths in the black population.119 The infant mortality rate for black babies 
was higher than for white as well with 87.5 per 1,000 black babies dying before their first 
birthday and only 53.2 per 1,000 white babies dying before their first birthday. As 
exemplified in the section of the study designating neighborhoods for white or black 
occupancy, high rates of disease, infant mortality and death were reason to condemn a 
neighborhood as unfit for white inhabitance. The Urban League used poor health of 
residents as justification to label a neighborhood condemned. 
The Urban League considered the importance of several factors that contributed 
to the higher rates of death and disease among the black population. Being generally 
poorer, black residents frequently could not afford medical treatment. Furthermore, in 
1926 a study of hospital and dispensary care available to black patients in the city 
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revealed that it was inadequate. Wards were so overcrowded with beds that there was no 
space for a chair or a table, that of 535 available rooms there was only one private room 
and five semi-private rooms available to blacks and finally, there was a theoretical over-
supply of 205 beds for white patients and a lack of at least 70 beds for black patients 
because of Jim Crow care.120 Thus, the Urban League exposed factors beyond the control 
of the black population of Baltimore but that were attributing to generally poorer health. 
The Urban League’s survey also devoted a section of its research to the discussion 
of race relations in Baltimore City. The League concluded that segregation and separation 
had, “tended to prevent the Negro’s adequate social functioning in the Baltimore 
community.”121 Baltimore blacks, uniquely caught in a city with northern and southern 
affiliations, enjoyed freedoms of northern cities such as sitting in any seat on the bus, yet 
were discriminated from department stores. Schools and movie theaters were segregated, 
the survey noted, yet Maryland was the only state in the United States with an Interracial 
Commission created by the State Legislature and appointed by the governor.122 The 
Interracial Commission was responsible to, “consider questions concerning the welfare of 
colored citizens of Maryland, recommend legislation and sponsor movements looking to 
the welfare of such people and the improvement of interracial conditions.” Thus, 
Baltimore’s black residents in 1935 found themselves at a crossroads between enjoying 
more rights and privileges than blacks in the Deep South and extreme discrimination and 
segregation on the part of white citizens and institutions as compared to the north. This 
disparity reflects the fundamental confusion in Baltimore’s identity as both a northern 
and southern city. 
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The Urban League concluded with a series of recommendations and reforms 
based on its’ findings. First, the report advocated that steps be taken to improve housing 
conditions. The Urban League criticized present inclinations to, “develop new segregated 
Negro areas in the more remote sections of the city”123 and urged persons close to the 
black community to be consulted before plans were drawn. Second, the League cautioned 
public and private officials to acknowledge the need for secure employment for black 
residents. In the realm of public health the League advocated a “vigilant, militant and 
intelligent campaign against venereal diseases (and tuberculosis).”124 Additionally, the 
League advocated for an improvement in care for mentally ill black residents, higher 
education for black students at public expense, and increased employment for blacks in 
the field of public health. Most importantly, the League emphasized the importance of the 
ballot and organized political presence in Baltimore City affairs, an idea that was far 
ahead of its time. 
Both the survey conducted by the Joint Committee and the study conducted by the 
Urban League pointed out similar characteristics of residential life for black 
Baltimoreans. Life in predominantly black neighborhoods was characterized by poor 
health, high crime, unemployment, and overcrowding. However the Joint Committee and 
the Urban League differed in their recommendations. While both the Joint Committee 
and the Urban League recommended rehabilitation of areas that could be converted for 
white use, the Urban League also made several pointed recommendations to improve the 
overall quality of life for black residents in Baltimore while simultaneously improving 
the built environment. Furthermore, the Urban League focused on structural constraints 
inflicted upon black residents that subsequently perpetuated bad behavior rather than 
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blaming race as the cause. Still, it is no surprise that ultimately Baltimore officials 
favored the recommendations made by the predominantly white, city government 
employed Joint Committee as opposed to the predominantly black Urban League. Using 
the growing body of evidence to suggest that life in black residential areas was 
substandard, the city council took advantage of the opportunity to legitimize segregation, 
slum clearance, and quarantine practices with the advent of federal public housing. 
Studies like these reinforced motivations for segregated housing projects since so many 
social ills were equated with race. Thus, housing authorities around the country found 
justification in demolishing areas of black residence to make room for housing projects 
that severed to quarantine and divide the city into black and white.  
In March 1934 the Associated Architects, comprised of architects who had served 
on the Joint Committee and had participated in the aforementioned study, submitted an 
application to the Housing Division for $31 million for seven housing projects on five 
different sites. In June, the Housing Division allocated $2 million to Baltimore.125 Based 
on the Joint Committee study the Associated Architects ultimately chose the McCulloh 
Street area for four projects on two adjacent sites. The McCulloh street area, bounded by 
Dolphin Street to the northwest, Druid Hill Ave to the southwest, Biddle Street to the 
southeast and Madison Ave to the northeast was seen as integral to the Associated 
Architects as it would, “provide adequate housing for two rent brackets of negros and two 
rent brackets of the white population.”126 Site 2-A was described as: 
once luxurious buildings of the post-bellum period, from which the well-to-do 
owners have departed nearly twenty years ago… Reinhabited as multiple 
dwellings by colored people, the properties now owned as income producers have 
been allowed to disintegrate to a point of practical uselessness… fifty-four 
[houses] are now vacant and are considered untentable. This is the most advanced 
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case of ‘blight’ in the city… [The site] is close to the centre of colored shopping, 
education, amusement and population.127 
 
The Associated Architects believed that adjacent site 3-A was suffering due to its 
proximity to the most serious area of blight in the city and its proximity to an area of 
black residence. If site 2-A was rehabilitated, the Architects believed site 3-A, “could and 
should be a white residential neighborhood, buttressing property values in the 
conservative and well liked white residence to the North, now terribly threatened by the 
dilapidation to the South and West of it.”128 From this plan one can see that the 
Architects, like the Joint Committee and Urban League before it, intended to build public 
housing projects in areas that would ultimately stabilize and benefit nearby white 
neighborhoods. Black residents would be removed from border areas and contained in 
concentrated public housing more centralized within black neighborhoods. Furthermore, 
the strategic placement of projects between white and black neighborhoods allowed the 
buildings to act as barriers between the neighborhoods.   
Both the black community and white planners supported the location of 2-A 
between a white and black neighborhood but for drastically different reasons. Black 
community leaders believed that redeveloping the area where the city’s largest black 
community intersected with a middle-class white neighborhood and the business district 
would strengthen community bonds and eliminate racial boundaries. White planners, on 
the other hand, prized these projects because they would reinforce segregation in the area 
where the controversy over residential segregation first began.129 Planners chose a site on 
the border between the slums at the south end of the black neighborhood in the Northwest 
and the Eutaw Place neighborhood to establish a buffer between a black and a white 
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neighborhood.130 Assistant architectural engineer W.E. Trevvett believed that the purpose 
of the proposed redevelopment sites was, “not for slum clearance but rather [for] using 
the projects to block the negro from encroaching upon white territory.”131 
Though originally planners wanted to construct two projects for black occupancy 
on the west and two projects for white occupancy on the east, ultimately federal and local 
officials resolved only to proceed with a project for black occupancy in the McCulloh 
area, between the white and black neighborhoods. A new site for white tenants was 
located in the Waverly neighborhood, which had a population slightly more than half 
black within an otherwise white community. Thus, in keeping with the primary goal of 
housing officials to reinforce, strengthen and expand white communities, the housing 
stock where the black population of Waverly lived would be removed to make room for 
the white projects.132 
Segregated housing projects were common around the country during the 1930s. 
Between 1934 and 1937 the PWA contracted for 51 projects in 36 cities, forty-nine of 
which were built in the continental United States. By 1937, twenty-one of the projects 
were occupied exclusively by white tenants, fifteen were occupied exclusively by black 
tenants, seven were racially mixed with tenants assigned by race to separate buildings or 
wings and only six were racially integrated.133 Roosevelt’s policy provided for a large 
level of discretion on the state level meaning states were free to reinforce, create or 
breakdown existing patterns of segregation as they pleased. In Baltimore, however, a 
long history of segregated housing predated federal public housing and thus, the agenda 
of segregation prevailed. 
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The agenda of slum clearance to make room for federal housing projects was 
never realized in Baltimore City. In January 1935, the Federal District Court of the 
Western District of Kentucky ruled in United States v. Certain Lands in City of 
Louisville, Jefferson County, KY that the Federal government did not have eminent 
domain to conduct slum clearance for public housing.134 On July 20, 1935 the Appellate 
Court upheld the lower court’s ruling. Following this decision the Housing Division 
instructed the Maryland Commission to abandon the McCulloh and Waverly projects and 
seek vacant land sites instead. The McCulloh neighborhood was eventually absorbed into 
the nearby Maryland Institute College of Art (MICA) while Waverly slowly declined. 
Today, Chesapeake Habitat for Humanity rehabilitates abandoned and dilapidated row 
homes in Waverly. The Housing Division suggested a site for black projects in southwest 
Baltimore and a site for white projects in east Baltimore creating the racial boundaries 
now deeply ingrained into Baltimore’s landscape.135 
In 1937, the United States Housing Act replaced the Housing Division of the 
PWA with the United States Housing Authority (USHA). The new division differed from 
the PWA in that it was restricted to granting financial and technical aid to local Public 
Housing Authority’s. The goal of USHA was to, “assist the several States and their 
subdivisions in alleviating present recurring unemployment, and to remedy the unsafe, 
and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and sanitary 
dwelling for families of low income in rural or urban communities.”136 Between 1938 and 
1941 USHA built approximately 132,500 units in 163 housing projects nationwide. 35% 
were housing projects occupied exclusively by black tenants, exclusively white tenants 
occupied 21%, and 44% were racially integrated or bisected.  
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The national pattern of segregation in housing projects was reflected in Baltimore 
City. The New Deal housing program set a precedent in 1934 with its “neighborhood 
composition rule” which prevented federally funded housing projects from altering the 
racial composition of their neighborhoods. The Housing Authority of Baltimore City 
(HABC) was formed on December 13, 1937 shortly after the creation of USHA. Mayor 
Howard Jackson appointed five men to the authority’s board of commissioners including 
Clarence W. Perkins as the executive director and one black man, George Murphy. The 
HABC was consistent with national patterns of segregated housing projects building only 
white and black projects and no mixed projects. Thus the HABC not only endorsed 
segregation but also increased it. The HABC selected five sites from among the 
“extensive regions of blight” identified in the 1934 Joint Committee report. The HABC 
classified the cause of blight in racial terms, “The inhabitants of these alley dwellings5 
usually succeed in moving into the perimeter of the block when their interior houses 
become ruinous. This in turn forces the white street dwellers to abandon the street.” 137 
The HABC decided to place a black project, Frederick Douglass Homes to the north and 
a white project, Clarence Perkins Homes, in the south. In order to address the issue of 
relocating families displaced by slum clearance projects, the HABC also decided to build 
two projects on the outskirts of Baltimore City (one white, one black) to house the 
displaced residents.  
One Baltimore resident agreed that there was a profound racial logic to public 
housing saying “it appears that the boundaries of colored neighborhoods will be 
expanded somewhat by the pressure to find homes for those driven from slum clearance 
                                                
5 Residents of alley dwellings were generally black.  
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sites.”138 This tactic allowed planners to justify segregation when planning housing 
projects. The HABC often sited the black residents in a prospective project site as a 
“serious social problem” believing that “clearing the area of its present population will go 
far to reverse the present trend to depopulation in this part of the city.”139 Again the 
HABC linked race to social ills such as poor health, crime, poverty and unemployment, 
here falsely naming the conditions of black residence as the cause, rather than a symptom 
of larger conditions.  
On October 4, 1939 the groundbreaking on Baltimore City’s first government-
subsidized homes began. On the corner of Poppleton and Saratoga streets, deep in the 
heart of West Baltimore, federal housing official Nathan Straus broke ground on what 
would become “Poe Homes” when it opened for residents on September 28, 1940.140 The 
project replaced 315 slum houses with homes for 298 black families.  
The first five public housing projects opened in the early 1940s, Edgar Allen Poe 
Homes, Latrobe Homes, McCulloh Homes, Douglass Homes and Perkins Homes, were 
located in neighborhoods surrounding the central business district.141 Three of the 
projects, Poe, McCulloh and Douglass homes, were designated for black residents while 
the remaining two, Latrobe and Perkins homes, were reserved for whites.142 The desire to 
manipulate and reinforce racial boundaries became more apparent in the site selection of 
Latrobe and Perkins Homes. Latrobe Homes, for example, straddled the boundary 
between a receding white Catholic community and a growing black community in east 
Baltimore. In strategically placing all-white Latrobe projects in this neighborhood, the 
HABC hoped to return the area to white use and push the black community out (See 
Appendix 32). The Baltimore Sun noted, “that the site was selected deliberately to halt 
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the northward expansion of the East Baltimore Negro District.”143 Similarly, Perkins 
homes were placed to reinforce residential segregation in East Baltimore by removing a 
pocket of black residency that was surrounded by white neighborhoods (See Appendix 
3).144 
In all, slum clearance projects made way for the five federal housing projects, 
which displaced 2,733 families.145 The projects consisted of low-rise blocks of about six 
attached units with a small front yard. They were generally arranged in a grid pattern and 
public space was minimal. Five more projects were built in the 1940s for war workers 
and four, Fairfield Homes, Brooklyn Homes, Westport Homes and O’Donnell Heights, 
were located on vacant land outside the inner city in areas of heavy industry. Some of 
these homes were only intended to provide temporary shelter. But Brooklyn homes, for 
example, were composed of one thousand wooden units and were not demolished until 
1962.146147 
Ten years after the study of blighted areas conducted by the Joint Committee and 
the Urban League, the Commission on City Plan released a report on the Redevelopment 
of Blighted Residential Areas in Baltimore, Conditions of Blight Some Remedies and 
Their Relative Costs on July 1, 1945. The plan emphasized containment of black 
residents. The Commission chose five sample areas of blighted neighborhoods for its 
study: South Waverly, of mixed use and race in 1945 but previously a predominantly 
white community, University Area, of mixed use and race in 1945 with the northwest 
section predominantly black; Camden, of mixed use and race but a predominantly black 
neighborhood; Armory, of mixed race but mostly white and primarily residential, and 
Broadway, mostly black and mostly residential in 1945.148   
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The Commission found these areas to be representative of the variations found 
within blighted areas as to density of occupancy, race of population, rental range and 
location in relation to the center of the city. The City as a whole was 19.4% non-white as 
compared to 44.9% non-white in the blighted areas studied. Population gain based on 
race throughout the city was mirrored in blighted neighborhoods. Between 1930 and 
1940 the total population in Baltimore gained 6.7% - the white population gained 4.6% 
and the non-white population gained 16.6%. In the blighted areas the total population 
gain was 3.8%, with white population loss of 5.44% and non-white population gain of 
17.83%.149 Thus, blighted neighborhoods still followed patterns of overcrowding and 
predominantly black residence. Though federal public housing was intended to be a 
solution to the problems of the urban poor bred in slums, clearly it was addressing a 
symptom rather than attacking the cause itself.  
The Federal Housing Act of 1949 created the Urban Redevelopment Agency and 
gave it the authority to subsidize three fourths of the cost of local slum clearance and 
urban renewal projects. In Baltimore project construction in the 1950s was guided by the 
Federal Housing act and by the Baltimore City Housing Authority’s report Baltimore’s 
Blighted Areas. The report sparked the urban renewal movement in the city after it 
classified most of the inner city as blighted. Title I of the Housing Act provided support 
and federal subsidies for slum clearance and private redevelopment while Title II 
authorized, nationally, the construction of over 800,000 units of public housing to aid in 
relocation and ease the housing plight of the poor. The enthusiasm surrounding urban 
renewal stopped short at public housing. Between 1950 and 1969 only five new projects 
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and three extensions (total 4259 units) were opened as opposed to the twelve projects 
(5421 units) built in half the time during the 1940s in Baltimore.150 
The first two redevelopment projects undertaken included the Waverly 
development and the Hopkins-Broadway developments. The Waverly project would 
displace almost 200 families, more than half of them black, and build 291 new homes for 
white occupancy. The Hopkins-Broadway site was home to 1,175 families, 1,138 of 
which were black. The plans would displace 956 families replacing the slums with only 
178 “moderately” priced units for black occupancy, 656 and 506 other dwelling units 
would be priced at market rate. In the case of the Hopkins-Broadway site blacks 
represented almost 90% of those to be displaced while 85% of the new dwellings were 
set aside for whites.151 In the end displaced black families were increasingly compacted 
into already overcrowded black neighborhoods due to economic constraints and racially 
restrictive covenants. The Urban League objected that the “segregation of colored 
families in the Waverly area, the limited access of Negro tenants to the Hopkins project 
and the creation of added blight by rehousing displaced Negro families in areas which are 
now overcrowded does not constitute redevelopment.”152 However as before, Baltimore 
officials were not interested in creating new housing opportunities for black residents or 
replacing the housing they demolished to make way for white projects or far fewer black 
homes. Instead, Baltimore officials were only concerned with removing blacks from 
areas that they believed were better suited for whites. Rather than create a permanent 
solution for the housing shortage for black Baltimore residents, Baltimore officials 
merely perpetuated a problem that had been growing since the turn of the century.  
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In Baltimore in 1941, white tenants occupied 701 public housing units while 
black tenants occupied 1,125 units.153 Thus, white occupancy was out of proportion with 
their residence and black residents were disproportionately excluded from occupancy. By 
the 1950’s there were more than 9,000 public housing units in Baltimore City.154 The 
HABC continued its agenda of slum clearance and increasing population density with the 
use of high-rise elevator buildings. Lexington Terrace, opened in December 1958, 
replaced 457 structures housing 561 predominantly black families with 677 units in four 
eleven-story buildings. George B. Murphy Homes opened in October 1963, replacing 473 
structures and 561 families with 758 new units.155Studies showed that the inner city black 
population was in the greatest need of public housing. Less than ten percent of white 
households lived in substandard housing in 1960, one third of non-white households did. 
Despite this fact the first project built in the 1950s, Claremont, was built outside the inner 
city in a white neighborhood for white tenants (See Appendix 33).156 
Though the head of Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) could have 
interpreted Brown v. Board of Education (1954) as a mandate to desegregate public 
housing, Albert M. Cole did not overtly subscribe to the court’s mandate to integrate. 
Instead, the HHFA released a new urban renewal plan which linked public housing to the 
need to relocate impoverished, displaced, inner city, minority residents away from white 
neighborhoods where black children would be able to integrate schools.157 The Federal 
Housing Act of 1954 modified urban renewal and redevelopment by requiring effected 
communities to adopt code enforcement, relocation and other methods to prevent further 
spread of urban blight. This mandate led to the construction of high-rise, inner city 
projects filled almost exclusively by black residents. The now infamous Layfayette 
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Courts was the first of many high-rise style projects opened in the early 1950s and early 
1960s.158  
The second half of the 1960s brought many changes to the public housing agenda 
in Baltimore City. Most importantly, federal aid became available for the rehabilitation of 
existing units for low-income occupancy and the leasing of existing units for public 
housing tenants. In 1969 Baltimore’s housing authority started a new public housing 
program modeled after one in Philadelphia using the funds made available by federal aid. 
The program called “Rehab Housing” converted vacant row houses into public housing 
units throughout the city. The first major rehabilitated project opened at Mount Winans, 
next to Westport Homes. The program was eventually renamed the Scattered Site 
program and eventually rehabbed 2,845 units with $40,000 to $45,000 in federal funds.159 
The homes that were selected for rehabilitation reinforced existing residential patterns 
thus creating areas of black concentration.  
In 1964 the government passed the Civil Rights Act, which introduced the 
concept of racial equality into federal programs. It was not until 1972, however, that 
racial and economic integration became a formal goal of the public housing site selection 
policy.160 For the first thirty years of the public housing agenda in Baltimore local 
officials disguised the blatantly segregationist program of public housing as “reducing 
blight” in the inner city. In fact, local officials used public housing to reinforce and 
enhance the existing separation between white and black in Baltimore City. Until 1964 
the only official racial consideration governing the location of public housing sites in 
Baltimore was the USHA requirement that the Local Housing Authority preserve, rather 
than disrupt, community social structures, which in fact served to justify further 
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segregation.161 However in Baltimore, public housing sites were selected to disrupt 
community and residence patterns. Whenever possible, Baltimore officials strategically 
placed a project in a site either to convert a neighborhood on the cusp of integration into 
white residence or to create a racially boundary between two areas. Thus, most housing 
projects built before 1964 reinforced and perpetuated racial segregation as it existed in 
Baltimore due to the segregation ordinances, slum clearance, restrictive covenants, 
redlining, and blockbusting.  
Baltimore began to officially integrate its public housing program in 1965. The 
all-white projects, Brooklyn Homes, O’Donnell Heights and Claremont, were most 
affected by this new agenda (See Appendix 33). Integration was well planned and 
executed at Brooklyn and Claremont however residents and members of the surrounding 
community of O’Donnell strongly opposed integration. New black tenants were excluded 
from many nearby shops and recreational facilities so although the housing projects 
themselves were integrated, the community did not welcome new tenants with open arms. 
Integration in Baltimore never involved bringing white residents into predominantly 
black areas – instead it always meant moving blacks into a predominantly white 
neighborhood.162  
Similar problems faced Flag House Courts, an inner city project that changed 
from white to predominantly black due to a racially changing neighborhood rather than 
new integration policy (See Appendix 33). When it was built in 1965, Flag House Courts 
was located in a predominantly white neighborhood with Little Italy on one side and a 
Jewish community on the other. Slowly the Jewish community migrated to the suburbs as 
black residents moved in. The manager of Flag House Courts observed exploitation on 
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the part of white shopkeepers and severe exclusion despite the “integration” of black 
residents in a predominantly white neighborhood. 163 
 Ultimately the desegregation of housing projects in Baltimore was deemed a 
failure. More than fifty years after housing projects were forced to integrate, in 1995 
black residents of Baltimore’s public housing projects filed a class action suit against the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Housing 
Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) for establishing Baltimore’s public housing system 
as a segregated program. In 2005 Thompson v. HUD was decided in favor of the black 
residents and the segregationist practices of the HABC were officially acknowledged.164  
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Chapter 4 
Riots and Revival 
 
 
 For three days following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King on April 4, 
1968 Baltimore erupted in a series of civil disturbances that further altered the social 
climate and physical landscape of the city for years to come. One Baltimore resident 
recalled, “After news spread that Martin Luther King Jr. had been shot, you could feel the 
tension in the air everywhere.”165 The city of Baltimore was overcome by an upheaval of 
racial violence that left six dead, dozens injured and hundreds of public and private 
buildings almost all but destroyed. White-owned commercial spaced in black 
communities were specifically targeted here. Liquor stores, drug stores, taverns and 
grocery stores were the most frequent targets of burning, looting and vandalism. One 
hundred and twenty seven grocery stores were looted, another thirty were looted and 
burned, three were burned but not looted and twenty-nine showed signs of vandalism. 
Seventy-four liquor stores were looted, sixteen burned and looted, and four burned 
without looting. Thirty-two drug stores were looted, two were burned, eight were 
subjected to fire and looting and four were vandalized. Looting was reported at forty 
taverns and bars, two were burned, nine were looted and burned and signs of vandalism 
were found at seven other locations. A total of 1,049 businesses were damaged.166  
Though the unrest lasted no more than three days, the violence spread over a 
thousand city blocks. The area covered by the riots was bounded by Patterson Park 
Avenue to the East, West Belvedere Avenue and 33rd Street to the North, Hilton Street 
and Hilton Road on the West and Pratt Street and Washington Boulevard to the South.167 
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The events culminated in the deployment of thousands of armed National Guard troops 
across the east and west Baltimore on the orders of Governor Spiro Agnew and the 
addition of regular Army troops by President Lyndon Johnson. Although the riots were 
sparked by Dr. King’s assassination, the onset of violence in Baltimore’s black ghettos 
was long anticipated. During the winter and early spring leading up to the riots of 1968, 
black spokespeople had urged Baltimore’s white politicians to respond to the need for 
better housing, job opportunities and recreation in Baltimore’s black ghettos. Milton L. 
Holmes, administer of CORE’s job-training program in Baltimore in the 1960’s 
explained the mounting tension, “The potential of violence is definitely here because of 
the racist society we live in. The white people have not been sincere in their efforts to 
improve the status of black society…they got to be concerned about the feeling of 
rebellion in the black community.”168 Both black and white city officials predicted civil 
disorders during the summer but still plans were not made to address growing concerns of 
black city residents. Instead, the assassination of Dr. King in April 1968 triggered a 
devastating expression of years of frustration and anger that manifested in rioting across 
Baltimore City.  
The riots of 1968 forced white and black Baltimore residents to confront the racial 
tensions and disparities that many had ignored for sixty years. For the first time white city 
officials were forced to contend with the blatant inequality of housing, employment 
opportunity, educational opportunities, resources and official attention toward black 
ghetto neighborhoods in East and West Baltimore. However, Urban renewal and 
redevelopment projects that occurred as a result of the riots only further segregated 
Baltimore City residents. Visions of redevelopment focused on the business and tourist 
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corridor centered around the inner harbor alongside renovation of the streets hit hardest 
by the riots while continuing to neglect the blatant needs for housing, educational, and 
social service development throughout black communities. In the end the riots gave life 
to the possibilities of redevelopment, but in Baltimore City, redevelopment became 
another expression of residential segregation.  
 Racial tension exploded onto the national landscape in the summer of 1967. Large 
sections of Newark, Detroit and Cleveland were devastated by civil disturbances in July 
with similar disturbances reaching from Milwaukee and Memphis to Cambridge on 
Maryland’s Eastern Shore. In response to mounting civil unrest since riots first began in 
1965 with the Watts Riot in Los Angeles, the Division Streets Riots of 1966 in Chicago 
and the 1967 Newark Riots, President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Kerner 
Commission on July 28, 1967 to investigate “[t]he origins of the recent major civil 
disorders in our cities. The Kerner Study focused on the basic causes and factors leading 
to such disorders,” and proposed “methods and techniques for averting or controlling 
such disorders,” including "[t]he appropriate role of the local, state and Federal 
authorities.”169 The Commission was composed of eleven members: Otto Kerner, 
Governor of Illinois, John Lindsay, Mayor of New York, Edward Brooke, Massachusetts 
Republican Senator, Fred Harris Oklahoma Democratic Senator, James Corman, 
California Democratic Congressman, William McCulloh, Ohio Republican Congressman, 
Charles Thornton, founder of defense contractor Litton Industries, Roy Wilkins, 
Executive Director of the NAACP, I.W. Abel, President of US Steelworkers of 
American, Herbert Jenkins, Police Chief in Atlanta, and Katherine Peden, Kentucky 
Commissioner of Commerce. Nine months later the National Advisory Commission on 
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Civil Disorders released its controversial findings on the causes of the riots and its 
recommendations for the future on February 29, 1968.  
The report berated federal and state governments for failed housing, education 
and social services policy. The commission believed that white racism, exemplified by 
symbols of white authority such as the police, was both the cause and remedy of civil 
disorder. Furthermore, white society was responsible for the creation of the ghetto, “What 
white Americans have never fully understood – but what the Negro can never forget – is 
that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white 
institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.”170 The report declared, “our 
nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal.”171 It 
continued, “Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the movement and 
deepened the division.  Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of 
American life; they now threaten the future of every American.”172 This statement may 
have been prophetic for some but for those living in Baltimore, the intimate relationship 
between race and residential segregation was a long forgone conclusion.  
By the late 1960s Baltimore had long ago begun to feel the impacts of residential 
segregation. Black neighborhoods were severely overcrowded, high rates of 
unemployment and poverty followed. Black leaders voiced their grievances about 
conditions in black neighborhoods. Floyd McKissick, the leader of CORE in the mid 
1960s, explained, “We tried to warn the nation about the problems of the cities but they 
didn’t heed it.”173  Around the time of the riots CORE began changing its mission from 
integrationist to separatist, focusing on building up the black community by supporting 
black businesses in the ghetto, for example McKissick explained, “lately… the cry for 
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‘black power’ has become one for ‘black control’ of ghetto areas and institutions.”174 
CORE’s message mirrored the desires of many black residents in Baltimore’s ghettos. 
Demands to eliminate discrimination and exploitation by merchants, requests for more 
vigorous protection by city agencies came alongside requests for public health and 
housing code enforcement.175 The list of complaints continued: high prices and lower 
quality foods than in middle-class white neighborhoods, exorbitant and deceptive credit 
practices, inflated prices for liquor and appliances (commonly around 33% above 
suburban prices), sale of used goods for new, evasion of warranties, fees for cashing 
checks, refusal by banks to cash welfare checks, dishonest increasing of rents or 
withholding of rent deposits, failure to make repairs in rental units, lack of proper heating 
or plumbing. With such blatant disproportionate distribution of resources, services and 
amenities in black ghettos, it is no wonder black residents did not respond earlier. After 
the riots the Maryland Crime Investigating Commission issued a report detailing the 
disturbances and postulating the conditions that bred the civil disorder. The commission 
cited ignorance, apathy, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease and lack of opportunity 
for decent jobs as causes of the riots.176 For Baltimore, the events of the mid 1960s 
merely offered the black community a catalyst for expressing their mounting complaints.  
 The Kerner Commission’s report on the national civil disturbances hinged on two 
related social movements: first, the migration of African Americans from the rural South 
to the urban North and second, the subsequent departure of whites from Northern cities to 
suburban enclaves. The report explained, “Almost all Negro population growth (98 
percent from 1950 to 1966) is occurring within metropolitan areas, primarily within 
central cities. The vast majority of white population growth (78 percent from 1960 to 
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1966) is occurring in suburban portions of metropolitan areas.  Since 1960, white central-
city population has declined by 1.3 million.”177 This national phenomenon was mirrored 
in the case of Baltimore. Beginning in 1950 the population of white residents was 
steadily declining. By 1970 the amount of black and white residents in Baltimore was 
almost equal, a telling statistic considering up until 1940 white residents outnumbered 
black residents 4:1(See Appendix 24). The commission attributed the creation and 
maintenance of black inner cities surrounded by rings of white suburbia to white 
institutions.  
The Kerner Commission report accurately forecast the effects of these social 
movements on urban housing. The report anticipated decreased housing opportunities 
flowing from increased racial segregation. It observed, “Discrimination prevents access 
to many non-slum areas, particularly the suburbs, and has a detrimental effect on ghetto 
housing itself.  By restricting the area open to a growing population, housing 
discrimination makes it profitable for landlords to break up ghetto apartments for denser 
occupancy, hastening housing deterioration.”178 Thus, the Kerner Commission was both 
predicting characteristics of urban housing in the future and reiterating patterns that 
existed since the beginning of the twentieth century.  
The report urged measures to put a stop to de-facto segregation. But if these 
policies were enforced by the state how could they be called “de-facto”? The case of 
Baltimore speaks to the inadequacy of such facial distinctions as the federal government 
and local agencies created and endorsed segregation policies well into the 1970s. The 
Kerner Commission recommended re-investment in the inner cities, adequate housing, as 
well as employment and recruitment of blacks in the media. The commission outlined the 
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“Integration Choice” strategy in the framework of employment, education and housing. 
The Commission’s strategy for housing was two-fold: First, it called for “a 
comprehensive and enforceable federal open housing law to cover the sale or rental of all 
housing, including single family homes.”179 To implement the law, the Commission 
advised, “voluntary community action” to increase awareness about suburban housing 
opportunities to urban minorities and to educate suburban communities about “the 
desirability of open housing.”180 Second, the Commission urged an expansion of federal 
housing programs that would create more low- and moderate-income units in suburban 
areas, thus adding six million units to the federal low-income housing inventory by 
1973.181 
Despite the report’s comprehensive and accurate assessment of the issues 
plaguing black inner city residents, the government did not pursue any of the 
recommended solutions. Within a month after the Commission issued its report President 
Johnson renounced a second Presidential term leading the way for Republican candidate 
Richard Nixon to take office. During the years of his presidency the urban and poverty 
programs of President Johnson’s administration gradually lost momentum and faded into 
the history books.  
In Baltimore, the initial reaction to King’s assassination was calm and the eve of 
King’s assassination passed without incident. On Friday images of burning cities flashed 
across televisions screens day and night. When the national rise in riots swept over 
Baltimore, city officials to signed into action their plan for handling civil disorder known 
as “Operation Oscar”.182 The Civil Defense agency developed Operation Oscar for 
coordinating police, fire, transit, and health and welfare departments with private 
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agencies like the Red Cross. On the same day Governor Agnew ordered the Maryland 
National Guard on alert as a precautionary measure. Later that afternoon two fire 
bombing incidents were reported to the police and at midnight the state police were put 
on alert.  
Some believe it was Governor Agnew’s address to Baltimore on Saturday 
morning that spurred the civil disobedience. Gregory Kane, sixteen at the time of the riots 
commented, “King was assassinated on a Thursday. That Saturday, when things were still 
calm here in Baltimore, Agnew went on the air for a special announcement. I knew 
immediately what he was going to say. ‘Don't do it, guv,’ I pleaded. ‘Just don't do it.’ But 
he did, complimenting Baltimore's black community on our ‘good behavior.’ As if being 
commended for being ‘good Negroes’ was what we wanted to hear at just that moment. It 
wasn't.”183 Whether it was because of Governor Agnew’s words, or years of built up 
tension and frustration, the riots began later that day. On Saturday afternoon word 
reached City Hall that people were distributing pamphlets along Gay Street demanding 
that business close in honor of Dr. King. Similar demands had preceded Washington’s 
riot. Civil Disobedience struck Baltimore City at 5:30 pm on April 6, 1968 when the first 
rock was thrown on Gay Street.184 The rioting began in East Baltimore and spread 
westward over the next three days (see Appendix 22). A crowd of young black men was 
rushing through the Gay Street area of East Baltimore and broke a store window. R.B. 
Jones recalled, “…All hell broke loose. They started looting stores, going north along 
Gay Street. The first fire started at the Lewis Furniture store on Gay Street.”185 Shortly 
thereafter the police became flooded with reports of window smashing. An hour after the 
first incident a looting was reported at a cleaning store on Gay Street followed by a fire at 
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a paint store on the same street. Police officers, many wearing riot helmets, arrived on the 
scene and attempted to disperse the crowds by driving slowly into the group of boys. At 
8pm on Friday Governor Agnew declared a state of emergency as a precautionary 
measure.  
Mayor Thomas J. D’Alesandro III believed the assassination of Martin Luther 
King caused the city to explode, “I don’t think that a large segment of the population 
knew how bad it was in those [black] neighborhoods, how deep the problems were. Jobs, 
housing, all the essentials for life were missing down there…”186 The Mayor’s 
description of the black communities as “down there” illustrates white Baltimore’s 
perception of the black ghettos as another world.  
 Reports of looting and fires from Gay Street and from neighborhoods in West 
Baltimore continued late into the night. One Baltimore Reporter recalled driving up to 
East North Avenue where several buildings were already ablaze, “I saw kids racing along 
the sidewalk and carrying burning torches. We turned south on Harford Road, where a 
big dry cleaning plant was already in ruins. No police or firemen were in sight. All this in 
daylight.”187 The first death occurred at 10pm on Saturday April 6th when a suspected 
looter was shot by…. The National Guard was called into East Baltimore and a curfew 
was imposed on the entire city at 10pm. Liquor sales were banned and gasoline sales 
were restricted. By midnight thousands of guardsmen and hundreds of police officers 
patrolled the streets. General George Gelston, Adjutant of the National Guard declared 
the situation to be under control.  
 The curfew was lifted at 6am on Sunday morning only to be followed by more 
lootings and fires across the city including the first major riot-related fire in West 
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Baltimore. In the early afternoon police barricaded the main downtown business and 
shopping area. Like housing policy in Baltimore City, the police approach was to fortify 
white spaces and contain black ones. Crowds of young black males were charging 
through the streets of East and West Baltimore leaving a path of destruction in their 
wake. Fires, looting, stoning of policemen and police cars as well as sniping increased 
throughout the day. At 4pm on Sunday the curfew was reestablished and at 6pm 
Governor Agnew requested the aid of Federal troops. Almost 5,000 soldiers arrived at 
10:30pm on Sunday night adding to the 5,700 National Guardsmen already present.  
 The destruction continued through Monday and Tuesday but remained restricted 
to black ghetto neighborhoods in east and west Baltimore. Census data shows that the 
concentration of violence was located in predominantly black neighborhoods across 
Baltimore City (see Appendix 23).  Police broke up a confrontation between white and 
black crowds on Monday and by Wednesday the violence subsided. By Friday the curfew 
and liquor bans were lifted and the Federal troops and National Guard left. Governor 
Agnew declared the state of emergency ended on 10am Sunday, April 14. The final toll 
tallied 6 killed, 600 injured, 1200 fires, 1100 businesses damaged by fires, vandalism 
and/or looting and property damages were estimated between $8 and $13.5 million.188  
 Melvin Williams, who became infamous as a Baltimore drug kingpin, witnessed 
the riots of 1968. Williams observed that most of the black businesses on Baltimore’s 
west side remained untouched but businesses belonging to whites were looted and 
burned.189 The report issued by the Maryland Crime Investigating Commission on the 
riots came to the same conclusion as Melvin Williams. The Commission found that 
burning and looting were purposely restricted to black ghettos and that the riot was 
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tightly organized and precisely executed. The Commission purported that the black 
militants were not trying to start a race riot but instead were “trying to establish 
machinery whereby the Negroes were run their own neighborhood stores. The first phase 
of the plan was to burn out the white merchants.”190 This report is consistent with the idea 
that in Baltimore Martin Luther King’s assassination provided the needed catalyst for the 
black community to air their grievances and route out the negative white influence over 
black neighborhoods. In a report issued by the American Friends Service Committee on 
the Baltimore civil disorders, author Jane Motz concluded, “The Baltimore story is not 
one of black against black. It is an expression of black people’s anger at the instruments 
and symbols of white exploitation and oppression.”191 Thus, the riots were not intended 
as acts of aggression against whites, but rather to take control away from white store and 
business owners in their own communities. Thomas A. Ward, a retired Circuit Court 
Judge, recalled, “vengeance was being directed against the physical symbols of white 
control, no matter if they were the local grocery store or coin laundry, or the apartment 
whose landlord wouldn’t fix the leaky roof. A passing white person was not the 
enemy.”192 White Baltimoreans walked through the streets without consequence.  
 Baltimore was spared the high toll of lost lives and civic guilt and anger that were 
experienced by Newark and Detroit because law enforcement officers were under strict 
orders to refrain from use of their guns. National Guardsmen carried live ammunition but 
their rifles were unloaded. Troops were instructed only to shoot if fired on and then only 
on orders of an officer or if the target was unmistakably a sniper and there was no danger 
of bystanders being involved. In later reports General Gelston claimed that only one 
Guardsman fired one round of ammunition over the head of a suspected looter. 
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Though most of the actions to deal with Baltimore’s troubles were directed at the 
black population, some efforts were made to work with the black community. Black and 
white groups tried to head off the trouble by holding memorial services and marches to 
facilitate conversation and airing out of emotions in a non-violent manner.193 When 
trouble began on Saturday, leaders of several activist groups like CORE, the Civic 
Interest Group (CIG) and the Union for Jobs or Income Now (U-JOIN) took to the streets 
to redirect the outburst and minimize damage. Some representatives of the Baltimore 
government such as the head of the Community Relations Committee and representatives 
from the Mayors office also attempted to minimize the damage as it happened.194  
The official attitude towards black activists was mixed. Mayor D’Alesandro 
contacted the CIG for help on Saturday while General Gelston tried to communicate 
openly with young black militants, some of whom were members of groups like CORE 
and others who were just black ghetto residents. Both the Mayor and the General issued 
passes to militant leaders permitting them to be on the strees after curfew. However once 
federal troops took over these passes were not recognized. An afternoon peace meeting, 
which had been authorized by Baltimore City Police, was broken up by troops wearing 
gas masks. On the whole efforts to assuage or redirect violent anger were uncoordinated 
and ineffective.195  
Days after the riots Governor Spiro T. Agnew met with a selected group of 
Baltimore civil rights leaders in an attempt to create a dialogue between the government 
and local authorities. Instead, however, the purpose of Governor Agnew’s speech seemed 
to be accusation,“…you know who the fires burned out just as you know who lit the fires. 
They were not lit in honor of your great leader. Nor were they lit from an overwhelming 
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sense of frustration and despair. Those fires were kindled at the suggestion and with the 
instruction of the advocates of violence.”196 In his speech Governor Agnew suggested 
that black power activist Stokely Carmichael had planted the seeds of civil disobedience 
in the minds of local civil rights leaders. “It is no mere coincidence,” Governor Agnew 
said, “that a national disciple of violence, Mr. Stokely Carmichael, was observed meeting 
with local black power advocates and known criminals in Baltimore on April 3, 1968 – 
three days before the Baltimore riots began.”197 This accusation was met with fierce 
opposition and defense. Walter Lively, director of the Baltimore Urban Coalition and 
head of U-JOIN commented, “Governor Agnew is trying to find a scapegoat… instead of 
facing the fact that the problems existed before and helped ferment the energies that 
caused the disturbance.”198  
In addition to accusing Stokely Carmichael Governor Agnew made a mockery of 
the Kerner Commissions pointed conclusions stating, “If our nation is not to move toward 
two separate societies – one white and one black – you have an obligation too… I call 
upon you to publicly repudiate, condemn and reject all black racists.”199 The Governor’s 
conclusion shows his misunderstanding of the matter at hand and misdirected blame. A 
black minister from Douglas Memorial Church commented on Governor Agnew’s racist 
statements saying, “…we found that the governor’s apparent intent was to divide the 
black community… Agnew’s actions are more in keeping with the slave system of a 
bygone era.” The minister also berated the governor for refusing to meet with students of 
Bowie College to resolve problems at their school and for refusing to close State offices 
to honor the memory of Dr. Martin Luther King. Walter Lively, director of U-JOIN, 
spoke on behalf of Baltimore’s black community explaining, “the actions of the last 
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several days clearly indicate that an overwhelming portion of the black community of this 
city do not want the white man to continue his economic colonization of our people.”200 It 
is clear that Governor Agnew’s attempt to create an open dialogue between Baltimore 
civil rights leaders failed. Instead his views reflected a failure on the part of white city 
officials to understand the issues facing the black community in Baltimore.  
Baltimore’s official response to the riots was relatively weak. City banks agreed 
to cash welfare checks without charge and to extend their hours. Inspection agencies 
became more diligent in checking practices of merchants in the ghetto. Some efforts were 
made to confront the issues raised through the riots. On Sunday April 14 religious leaders 
in Baltimore led a “Procession of Penance” as a confession of shared guilt for white 
racism and a pledge of support for the ideals of Martin Luther King. A month later two 
seminars were held at Loyola College to explore the racial crisis in Baltimore. A series of 
meetings under the title “what color is power?” was sponsored by eight white upper 
middle class churches in North Baltimore.201 
More than forty years after the riots, empty lots, abandoned store fronts, and 
vacant homes encompass Baltimore’s downtown as a result of the 1968 riots. Despite the 
obvious reminders of the riots, many Baltimoreans still do not connect the disinvestment 
in the inner city and lack of small businesses to the decisions Baltimore families and local 
officials made as a result of the riots; whereby redevelopment continued the legacy of 
racial segregation and black community neglect.  
It is difficult to draw concrete conclusions on the effects of the riots for the urban 
and geophysical landscape of Baltimore City. Though initial response to the riots was 
decline and despair, it was soon followed by a period of rebirth. More public health and 
82 
social services, new schools, more subsidized housing, increased public and private 
employment of blacks and increased political representations are among the positive 
outcomes of the riots of 1968. However, there were negative repercussions of the riots as 
well. More and more citizens, white and black, withdrew to the outskirts of the city as the 
poverty, crime and social ills associated with the black ghetto spread across the city. Even 
ten years after, one Sun reporter concluded that the riots “aroused fears which have only 
partially diminished [ten years later],” citing an increased unemployment rate, increased 
dependency on public welfare, and difficulty emerging from the hold of the black 
ghetto.202 The Baltimore Sun reflected on changes within Baltimore City. “Many of the 
inner city areas hit hardest by the rioting had been scheduled for slum clearance… the 
realization of urban renewal plans in the intervening years has transformed large areas of 
the inner city.”203 The most dramatic changes took place in West Baltimore along 
Pennsylvania Avenue. Dingy bars and over 1,300 rapidly deteriorating dwellings were 
razed and replaced with 1,360 new dwelling units. Additional public facilities such as 
schools, health centers, parks, recreation and community centers were built for both black 
and white residents who moved into the newly rehabilitated Pennsylvania Avenue. 
None of the new construction following the riots of 1968, however, was meant to 
be low-income housing. Purchasing a new home constructed in urban renewal areas cost 
as much as $29,000 while rents ranged from $150 for a one-bedroom apartment to $350 
for a four-bedroom townhouse. This resulted in the permanent displacement of many 
poor people who once lived in the urban renewal areas because prices of new homes were 
not equivalent to previous home values and thus excluded the old neighborhood 
residents.204 In 1978 one in four Baltimore families were estimated to be living in 
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substandard housing with 12,000 families on the waiting list for public housing. Almost 
every black neighborhood was cited as having been affected by the displacement of over 
9,700 families by urban renewal and expressway projects. A black Howard Park 
businessman explained, “if you tear down one slum, all you do is create another slum. 
That’s what’s happening around here...”205 Throughout Baltimore slums were destroyed 
to make way for new construction. Because homes were not built for displaced black 
residents they were again forced to crowd together in areas with already high black 
concentration. Again, overcrowding and poverty bred social ills in black ghettos. Slum 
clearance, even under the agenda of urban renewal, did not solve the problem of blight 
and slum conditions – it merely moved it from one black neighborhood to another.  
In the 1960s Baltimore City officials made plans to extend Route I-70 in 
Baltimore and connect it with the nearby Baltimore Beltway. Plans were to extend the 
highway across the harbor with a sixteen-lane bridge in order to connect it with I-95.206 
The East-West Expressway would lead through Leakin Park and many other historic and 
predominantly black neighborhoods. Construction began in West Baltimore destroying a 
20 blocks of houses and communities along Franklin and Mulberry Streets displacing 
thousands of families. Plans were halted in the early 1970s when activists protested the 
imminent destruction of historic districts like Federal Hill, along the inner harbor, and 
Fells Point. Only now, forty years later, are plans being proposed to demolish the 
“Highway to Nowhere”. The Highway to Nowhere represents the destruction of a stable 
black community for an abandoned urban renewal project. In writing for the Baltimore 
Sun Kelly Jaques remarked, “In many ways, the highway plans and the riots were linked. 
To the people who lived in the neighborhoods slated for clearance, the expressway 
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proposals made it clear their homes and schools and luncheonettes and grocery stores 
were less important than an exit ramp. Public policy declared over and over again that 
Baltimore's black neighborhoods were disposable; in 1968 rioters treated them 
accordingly,”207 In Baltimore, alongside other racially contentious urban contexts, “urban 
renewal” was interchangeable with “urban removal”. As with previous segregationist 
agendas, urban renewal projects had no qualms about destroying black communities to 
make way for “improvements” that would maintain or increase the land values of white 
spaces while being primarily used by white residents.  
Fifteen years after the riots the Baltimore Sun published an article highlighting the 
surge in construction following the riots. Pennsylvania Avenue, once a main street of 
black West Baltimore, was badly torched but later the lower portion was replaced by new 
housing for the elderly, churches and community centers. On the East Side of Baltimore, 
Gay Street was resurrected as the Oldtown Mall, a two block pedestrian shopping mall, 
and a new location for public housing. While the riots changed the physical landscape of 
many streets of Baltimore, they also sped up the process of white flight. Before the riots, 
two sears stores were the retail centers of black Baltimore with white consumers utilizing 
the shopping centers as well. After the riots, however, white shoppers and some retailers 
abandoned Howard Street for the suburbs. The riots helped speed commercial flight from 
black America. The Baltimore Bullets basketball team fled Baltimore to suburban 
Washington. Mayor Thomas J. D’Alesandro III, once cheerful at the prospect of his 
position, became anxious to see his position end.  
The Sun credited Mayor William Donald Schaefer, Baltimore’s hometown boy, 
for guiding Baltimore back to a place of optimism and hope after the riots. After taking 
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office in 1971, Mayor Schaefer was credited for the expansion and revitalization of the 
Inner Harbor, bringing the Blast soccer team to Baltimore and reopening some of the 
city’s historic theaters. However, fifteen years after the riots much of the physical 
damage blended into pre-existing decay. Declining black ghettos, the primary sites of the 
riots, were often condemned to further deterioration as urban renewal agendas again 
focused only on those areas in between white and black neighborhoods. Baltimore of 
1983 boasted an integrated workplace though a still largely segregated residence.208  
Development of the inner harbor came on the heels of the riots. At the turn of the 
twentieth century Baltimore’s inner harbor was a bustling center. A center of commerce 
and industry, merchants lined the piers selling their wares and department stores for 
whites encircled the water (See Appendix 29). The harbor was home to many large 
shipping companies that were the chief employers of newly migrated black residents. 
Thus, the area immediately surrounding the harbor was home to many blacks in the years 
leading up to the turn of the century. Blacks lived in historical “alley houses” which were 
characterized by their narrow size and close proximity. After the Baltimore Fire in 1904 
however, much of downtown, including the inner harbor, was decimated. What used to 
be a bustling center where merchants, businessmen, and black migrants came to work 
became home to rats and rotting piers. The dingy inner harbor waterfront, once the 
vibrant center of Baltimore, stood as a deserted reminder of what downtown Baltimore 
once was. After the fire, Baltimore’s shipping industry moved to Locust Point southwest 
of the inner harbor and towards Dundalk in southeast Baltimore. While businesses and 
industry left downtown Baltimore, blacks were largely restricted to the now slowly 
deteriorating alley houses. Black residents crowded together in the small row houses 
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surrounding the harbor in conditions that bred disease. “Blight” was soon characterized in 
racial terms, as the city’s worst slum conditions were located surrounding the inner 
harbor where most black residents lived.  
By the 1920s and 1930s these areas were slated for slum clearance as Baltimore 
City officials sought means to remove blight and force the black population outward. In 
1921 Mayor Broening appointed seven members, both city officials and private citizens, 
to the Baltimore Zoning Commission. The Commission was charged with the duty of 
preparing a comprehensive zoning plan for Baltimore. By placing the downtown central 
business district surrounding the inner harbor within the First Commercial District 
category, planners secured the region’s commercial future. Furthermore, the Mayor, City 
Council and Zoning Board were given broad power to make choices determining the use 
of the zoned areas adding a political dimension to zoning.209 By zoning the inner harbor 
area as commercial and covering black spaces in restrictive covenants, a buffer was 
created between the harbor and surrounding Black residences. Segregation ordinances 
and restrictive covenants barred blacks from housing opportunity forcing them again to 
crowd together in sections of the city that were already predominantly black. But even 
once blacks moved away from the inner harbor, the waterfront remained a ghost town 
until the urban renewal agenda of the 1950s and 1960s prompted planners to rebuild the 
deteriorating harbor. 
After World War II Baltimore’s central business district suffered from a $50 
million decline in the value of downtown property.210 The city’s business community 
banned together and created a Committee for Downtown to raise private funds for the 
preparation of a master plan that would be the basis for reversing the decline. The task 
87 
was handed down to the Planning Council of the Greater Baltimore Committee. Halfway 
through planning, however, the business leaders concluded that their original plan to 
revitalize the entire 300-acre business district might be too ambitious so they downsized 
and focused the project on 22 acres. This plan developed into the $140 million Charles 
Center Project.211  
Mayor Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr. acquired a $25 million city bond issue and 
helped push through the urban renewal ordinance needed to issue power of eminent 
domain to begin the project. Though Baltimore could not find the funds to build housing 
for displaced residents subjected to slum clearance as a part of urban renewal, Mayor 
D’Alesandro had no problem acquiring public funds to revitalize and rebuild an area 
meant to attract white upper class consumers and residents. The cornerstone of the 
project, One Charles Center, was designed by Mies van der Rohe and completed in 
1962.212 By 1963 three more structures were completed and six were in the planning 
stages including two office buildings, a hotel, department store, theater and underground 
garage. The speed and success of the Charles Center Project inspired the public and 
private sector to take on redevelopment of the downtown waterfront. 
Mayor Theodore R. McKeldin set the plan for waterfront redevelopment in 
motion. The plan had three facets: first, a row of office buildings along Pratt Street facing 
the waterfront, second, multifamily housing along the eastern and western edges of the 
waterfront, and third, in the center, a public playground for Baltimoreans along the 
shoreline of the Inner Harbor (See Appendix 30). One third of the planning area would be 
razed and rebuilt and the remaining two thirds, including city hall and the financial 
district, would be rehabilitated.213  
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Under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 Baltimore officials leveled all of 
Baltimore’s downtown high-rise public housing to make way for inner harbor 
development. Five thousand housing units were demolished. Under Title I urban renewal 
projects that eliminated residential structures had to compensate by creating new 
residences on a 1:1 ratio with the eliminated structures. However, this provision was 
rarely followed and no regulations stipulated that low-income housing had to be replaced 
with similarly priced alternatives. In downtown Baltimore public housing units were 
replaced by 3,200 luxury high-rise and townhouse units. Thus by the 1960s, the urban 
renewal agenda in Baltimore became identified with socio-economic status as 
redevelopment was catered to the upper class. Those displaced by the development of the 
inner harbor were forced to find alternatives in poor neighborhoods with high 
concentrations of vacancy and crime.214    
Developers projected the timeline of the project to last thirty years but it was 
ultimately accomplished in twenty. In 1969 work began on attracting businesses to the 
office buildings that would be built on Pratt Street. USF&G insurance, a native company 
of Baltimore, was the first to step forward with a proposal to build a 36-story tower at the 
focal point of the Inner Harbor – the intersection of Pratt and Light streets. IBM, the 
Federal Reserve Bank, the C&P Telephone Company, Equitable Trust Bank and the 
Federal Courts soon followed suit.215 Three years later the Maryland board of public 
works approved the construction of a 28-story World Trade Center.  
In 1972 Mayer William Donald Schaefer came into office and took over the Inner 
Harbor redevelopment plan. By this time, previous urban renewal plans aimed at inner 
city development were abandoned. City officials believed inner harbor redevelopment, 
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which was meant to attract white consumers and eventually upper class white residence, 
was more important. Building an attractive inner harbor would stimulate commerce and 
industry thus, creating an epicenter of white consumption and residence. This end had the 
added benefit of pushing black ghetto neighborhoods to the east and west of the center of 
the city. By 1973 work began on the public park that was to overlook the harbor. The 
shoreline around the Inner Harbor basin was rebuilt, the streets were redesigned as wide 
boulevards, and a multi lane highway was built outward from inner harbor connecting to 
I-95 thereby enclosing historic Federal Hill and limiting foot traffic from neighborhoods 
to the southwest of the inner harbor. A 35-foot-wide promenade was also added to the 
water’s edge. This promenade not only served to designate the harbor as a recreational 
space, but also created a border between the gentrified inner harbor and the black 
neighborhoods that surrounded it. Only the second facet of the plan, housing, had not 
been realized by the 1970s. The city’s Department of Housing and Community 
Development (HCD) adopted a new “homesteading” program for the Otterbein 
neighborhood to the west of the Inner Harbor. Through this program the HCD offered 
dilapidated row houses for $1 each to local residents who would agree to restore and live 
in them. The 150 units were renovated for an average of $50,000 each in borrowed 
funding based on credit rating. Black residents were inherently excluded from this deal 
because it was not announced publicly.216 Through this program Otterbein became one of 
the trendier neighborhoods in downtown Baltimore, home to artists, musicians and 
performers. 
In 1975 construction of the Maryland Science Center was underway with plans to 
build an aquarium and convention center. Between 1979 and 1981 four major attractions 
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were completed along the Inner Harbor: the Baltimore Convention Center was completed 
in 1979, the National Aquarium in Baltimore opened in 1981, the Hyatt Regency opened 
in 1981 and finally the festival marketplace known as Harborplace, built by world-
famous Baltimore developer James Rouse, opened in the Inner Harbor on July 4, 1980.217 
The opening of James Rouse’s harbor pavilion in 1980 marked the beginning of 
gentrification in southwest Baltimore. 
Development of the Inner Harbor continues to this day. As of 2000 more than 60 
new projects were built or rehabilitated: 15 office buildings, 12 hotels, ten museums and 
17 other attractions plus a subway station have been built in the last ten years. The Inner 
Harbor project also continues to stretch its boundaries beyond the waterfront. To the 
North Rouse Company added a 1.2 million square foot mixed use Gallery project, to the 
South the American Visionary Art Museum and to the west Oriole Park at Camden Yards 
has extended the pedestrian area that the Inner Harbor has become.218 
Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, once considered home to blight, disease and poverty, 
now houses world-class attractions and serves as a revitalized and rehabilitated urban 
center. The alley houses, once thought only suitable for black residence, now sell for 
upwards of two million dollars. Inner harbor revitalization has expanded towards 
immigrant neighborhoods of east Baltimore, displacing residents in favor of trendy 
apartment buildings inhabited by post-college graduates. The riots of 1968 marked the 
beginning of late twentieth century urban renewal projects across Baltimore City. 
Development of the waterfront and downtown Baltimore began to bring white residents 
back into downtown and initiated a larger movement of gentrification in the city.  
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As Baltimore officials continue to build on the success of the inner harbor 
revitalization projects that began in the 1970s, more and more residents are being 
displaced to make way for commercial and residential redevelopment meant to attract 
upper class white residents. I-83 once trickled into downtown Baltimore with a view of 
an abandoned waterfront composed of old warehouses and abandoned row houses in the 
1990s. Today, entering the city from the suburbs one is greeted by a magnificent gold 
fountain surrounded by Roy’s Hawaiian Fusion, a Marriot Courtyard Hotel and a large 
Whole Foods Market. Boutiques and loft apartments surround the waterfront serving as a 
reminder that the Baltimore planning agenda will always favor the white or at least 
relatively affluent consumer. Former residents of the new waterfront redevelopment have 
again been pushed out of downtown Baltimore into East and West Baltimore. Today, one 
can see a pocket of white residence surrounding the inner harbor and waterfront to the 
east with densely populated black neighborhoods encircling downtown Baltimore. 
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Chapter 5 
Under the Wire: Mapping the History of Residential Segregation Baltimore  
 
 
On the surface Baltimore appears to be just another large, decaying Eastern city, 
having experienced population decline, out migration of commerce and industry, an 
expanding black minority, rise in social problems, and general deterioration. Many would 
assume a cause and effect connection between Baltimore’s simultaneous black in-
migration and white flight. However this explanation, combined with Baltimore’s 
national image in popular culture, has done a disservice to the complex history of 
Baltimore’s past. Underneath images of the most visible social ills known for destroying 
America’s cities, Baltimore City has played host to and been shaped by a much more 
enduring and many times legal vice: segregation. 
Close examination reveals that Baltimore’s narrative is more than just symbolic of 
the decline of American cities; Baltimore’s story reflects racial investment and 
divestment policies with the intent of shaping Baltimore into a racially segregated city. 
The urban landscape of Baltimore is a history book, a readable narrative of the gradual 
creation of a segregated city. The result of a one hundred year long residential 
segregation agenda can be seen in census maps depicting the changing racial dispersion 
across Baltimore City. Today, Baltimore is defined by two islands of densely populated 
black residence in East and West Baltimore divided and surrounded by white settlement. 
The two Baltimore’s that exist in 2010, one white and one black, are a result of racially 
motivated policies and practices that began with the segregation ordinances of 1910. 
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 In 1910 Baltimore was predominantly white. Of the city’s half-a-million residents 
only 15% were black. Black residents were concentrated in the downtown business 
district near shipyards and docks where most black Baltimore residents worked at the 
turn of the century while and white residents formed a ring around them. In the last 
hundred years Baltimore’s population demographic has changed dramatically and the 
white ring has returned. In 2010 Baltimore’s population totaled 637,418. Of that number, 
33% of city residents are white and 67% of residents are black. This dramatic change in 
the composition of the city’s population reflects the persistent imposition of measures to 
segregate the city based on race. Though residential segregation began with the first 
segregation ordinances to be seen in the United States in 1910, the city government and 
residents enacted residential segregation through public and private action over the last 
one hundred years. 
Although black residents only made up 15% of Baltimore’s total population of 
558,485 in 1910, (See Appendix 24) whites residents alleged an  “encroachment” of 
black residents into predominantly white neighborhoods. The first recorded attempt by a 
black family to move into a predominantly white neighborhood prompted private citizens 
to pressure local Baltimore officials to impose restrictions on the proximity of black 
residence to white residence. The introduction of residential segregation ordinances in 
1910 helps explain a future of residential isolation and confinement for black residents of 
Baltimore City. 
Once the Supreme Court struck down residential segregation ordinances in 1917, 
restrictive covenants became a new instrument of racial separation. White residents 
sought protection from black intrusion through deeds that barred blacks from buying or 
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occupying real estate in a prescribed block or multi-block radius. In 1925, Carl and 
Matilda Schoenrodt filed a covenant along with twenty-six homeowners on their agreeing 
that: 
“None of the said respective properties nor any part of them shall at any time be 
occupied or used by or conveyed, mortgaged, leased, rented or given to any Negro 
or to any person or persons in whole or in part of Negro or African descent. 
Persons of negro or African descent may be employed as servants by any of the 
owners or occupant of said respective property and whilst so employed may 
reside in said premises as servants as long as the premises are occupied by their 
respective employers.”219 
 
The covenant above protected Appleton Street, to the west of Fulton Street, which in 
1940 census maps is clearly inhabited by white residents (See Appendix 9). In Maryland, 
a Court of Appeals ruling in 1938 against a black man who had moved to a white 
Baltimore block a year earlier strengthened enforcement of restrictive covenants. The 
house was within a twenty-four-square block area that white residents had protected by a 
covenant written in 1926. The legality of restrictive covenants was upheld until 1948. In 
Maryland, racially restrictive covenants were used across the city but West Baltimore, at 
the border of Fulton Street, and North Baltimore were subject to covenants in particular. 
Edward Bouton built Roland Park in North Baltimore, under a restrictive covenant with 
the intent of creating Baltimore’s first elite, white, and upper class neighborhood.  
By 1930 black citizens made up almost 20% of Baltimore’s 804,874 city residents 
yet there were confined to only 2% of the city’s land area. In 1933 Baltimore’s HOLC 
office opened with 14 white men as part of the Home Owners’ Refinancing Act 
introduced as part of New Deal legislation by President Roosevelt.220 The HOLC was 
charged with assessing neighborhoods and dividing them into real estate risk categories, 
adding a cartographic dimension to the pathology of race in America and residential 
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segregation. “Redlining,” dictated the current value and future prospects of a 
neighborhood based on categories including the racial composition of the area. As one 
might imagine, neighborhoods that were predominantly black received the lowest rating 
and were marked in red (hence the term “redlining”). Comparing the 1940s census tract 
map to the redlining map issued by Baltimore’s HOLC one sees a clear correspondence 
to race: the ring surrounding downtown is shaded red and surrounded by yellow (the 
second worst rating a neighborhood could be given) (See Appendix 1). The Census tract 
map similarly shows a concentration of black residents surrounding downtown to both 
the east and west of the central business district near the waterfront. The more favorable 
neighborhoods as noted by the HOLC’s map extended to the northwest and northeast of 
the city where we can see, when comparing the 1940s census map, less than 5% of the 
residents were white or black (See Appendix 9). 
In 1940 Baltimore’s population swelled to 859,100 composed of 692,705 white 
residents and 166,395 black residents. Although whites still outnumbered blacks 81% to 
19% the number of black residents was steadily increasing (See Appendix 24). Census 
maps showing racial dispersion across the city illustrate two distinct islands of black 
residence: one on the east side of downtown and one on the west side of downtown (See 
Appendix 9). Today, these two islands have become a defining characteristic of 
Baltimore’s identity. Black residents in East Baltimore were bounded to the north and 
south by North Avenue and Fleet Street and to the east and west by Wolfe Street and Gay 
Street. Black residences in West Baltimore were bounded by Fulton Ave to the East, 
North Ave, Pratt Street and Gay Street. By 1940 the area surrounding the downtown 
business district and inner harbor was more than 30% black according to census data. 
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Although black residents occupied large sections of downtown Baltimore in the 1940’s 
one can see from the maps that a dividing line runs down the center of the city along 
Calvert and Gay Streets. This line, which is still visible in census maps of 2010, relegated 
black residents to either side of the central business district.  
The 1940s brought the first construction of low-income housing projects to 
Baltimore City. Early site selection criteria required builders to respect the racial make-
up of a neighborhood when determining where a project was to be built, resulting in a 
reinforcement of existing racial residence patterns. The first low-income projects built in 
Baltimore was Edgar Allen Poe Homes designated for black residents and located deep in 
the heart of West Baltimore. Latrobe Homes, was located just north of downtown and 
was designated for white use, while McCulloh and Douglass Homes were built for black 
residents and located in West Baltimore and north of the harbor respectively. Perkins, 
Fairfield, Brooklyn, Westport, and Gilmor Homes were built 1942, while O’Donnell 
Heights, Somerset Courts were built in 1943 and finally Cherry Hill Homes was built in 
1945 (See Appendix 32).221 As the Fair Housing Act was not passed until 1949, 
Baltimore housing officials were able to designate projects for all white or black 
occupancy.   
The first housing projects in Baltimore City were built on areas slated for slum 
clearance to make way for new construction. Black citizens were displaced as a result of 
slum clearance projects while new projects provided homes for only a fraction of the 
displaced black homeowners. Thus, black residents were again forced to crowd together 
perpetuating slum conditions that Baltimore City officials attempted to assuage through 
slum clearance projects.  
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Ever since the 1910 segregation ordinances the western boundary of black 
residence was marked by Fulton Street. In 1944 the first black resident broke the 
boundary moving beyond Fulton Street thus pushing the barrier of black residence 
westward.222 The Fulton Street barrier was defeated by blockbusters who saw an 
opportunity to capitalize on white fears of depreciating home values and other social ills 
they perceived to follow black residence. For the next sixty years black residents would 
continue to expand westward pushing whites beyond the city limits and out into the 
county. Maps showing racial composition and population of Baltimore City from 1930-
1970 illustrate the drastic westward expansion of Baltimore’s black population. Once the 
floodgates of Fulton Street were opened black residents poured into West Baltimore with 
unprecedented speed.223 Comparing census maps of 1940 to present day estimates one 
can see the westward expansion of black residents beyond Baltimore City limits (See 
Appendix 9 and Appendix 16). Furthermore, the 1948 Supreme Court held that racially 
restrictive covenants were unenforceable thus compelling West Baltimore residents to 
abolish covenants that had barred black residents from westward expansion.   
The 1950s brought more black residents into Baltimore City. Baltimore’s total 
population grew to a record high 949,708 city residents. Of almost 1 million city 
residents 723,675 were white and 226,053 were black (See Appendix 24). Census maps 
show black residents crowding around the downtown business district leaving only a 
pocket of white residences immediately north of the inner harbor. It is no coincidence 
that these same primarily black residential areas were designated as “blighted” according 
to the study published by the Baltimore City Housing Authority in 1950 Baltimore’s 
Blighted Areas (See Appendix 4). Overcrowded dwelling units, substandard sanitation, 
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and high incidences of disease defined blight. These characteristics defined black 
neighborhoods surrounding downtown but not white neighborhoods. Blacks tended to be 
confined to second-class homes because the real estate market shaped by restrictive 
covenants permitted owners to raise the rental price of a home for blacks. Thus, blacks 
were forced to squeeze more families into a space meant for far fewer people. Whites 
were able to escape the ailments of black “blighted” areas because the real estate market 
permitted them to move out overcrowded homes, they had access to better education, and 
employment opportunities. In contrast, black residents were hemmed into overcrowded 
neighborhoods by lack of employment opportunities, racist real estate practices and a 
lack of educational opportunity. Many of the areas outlined in this study were slated for 
slum clearance and as sites for low-income housing projects. Through the plethora of 
studies like Baltimore’s Blighted Areas city officials intrinsically labeled “blight” as a 
racial characteristic. 
The 1950s and 1960s brought the issue of race and segregation to the forefront of 
American consciousness with the advent of landmark court decisions like Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Though tensions were high in 
many parts of the country, in Baltimore local civil rights leaders engaged in open 
dialogue with local city officials. However, Dr. Martin Luther King’s assassination in 
1968 sparked rioting across the city. Rioters were predominantly black youths who 
targeted stores and residences of white Baltimoreans. Maps comparing the locations of 
rioting incidents and the racial make up of the area show that most incidents occurred in 
predominantly black neighborhoods across east and west Baltimore (See Appendix 23). 
Although the riots only lasted three days the impact on Baltimore City was felt for years 
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to come. Though triggered by Dr. King’s assassination tensions regarding inadequate 
housing, lack of public facilities and social services in black neighborhoods were 
mounting and came to a head through the riots of 1968. 
Baltimore’s black population continued to push westward in the 1960s. 
Unfortunately census tract data is unavailable for this decade and thus corresponding 
maps could not be created (See Appendix 11 for substitute maps). By 1970 Baltimore’s 
population had declined by almost 50,000 residents. White residents fled to Baltimore 
County where taxes were lower, schools were better and blacks were inherently excluded 
due to higher property costs and racial steering and outright neighborhood 
discouragement of black residents. Meanwhile the black population of Baltimore City 
almost doubled in twenty years reaching 425,950 residents of a total 905,759 residents 
(See Appendix 24). Black residents further stretched the boundaries of their isolation into 
northeast Baltimore. Black population density increased in the areas immediately 
surrounding downtown as areas north of downtown gentrified causing housing prices to 
exclude blacks from the market.  
In 1980 the composition of Baltimore’s population reached a turning point. 
Despite perceptions of racial invasion in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s that drove urban 
policy, Baltimore City did not become majority black until 1980. In 1980 the total 
population of Baltimore City was 786,775, 43% white and 56% black (See Appendix 24). 
Despite this shift in the composition of the population, blacks were still relegated to the 
east and west of downtown Baltimore. According to scholars Douglas Massey and Nancy 
Denton, by 1980 Baltimore was among sixteen metropolitan regions that were 
“hypersegregated”.224 Baltimore ranked highest in the areas of centralization (“the extent 
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to which blacks are spatially distributed close to, or far away from, the central business 
district”) and concentration (“a measure of the relative amount of physical space 
occupied by blacks within the metropolitan environment”).225 Census maps clearly show 
this hypersegregation (See Appendix 13). 
In 1995 African-American public housing residents backed by the American Civil 
Liberties Union filed a class-action suit against the HUD and the Baltimore City Housing 
Authority aimed at eliminating alleged racial segregation and discrimination in 
Baltimore’s public housing units. The residents alleged that the Baltimore City Housing 
Authority was perpetuating former de jure segregation through racially based 
assignments of public housing applicants and through their site selection practices.226 The 
parties agreed to some of the claims raised in the class action suit and an agreement was 
reached in 1996 in the form of a Consent Decree thus affirming the charge that Baltimore 
housing officials were in fact basing public housing assignments on race. The Consent 
Decree imposed many obligations on the Baltimore City Housing Authority that 
ultimately the Supreme Court found the Authority had not fulfilled.  The Baltimore City 
Housing Authority failed to make available 911 housing units (as opposed to rent 
vouchers) in areas without high concentrations of minority residents or public housing. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court in 2005 the Baltimore City Housing Authority 
had only made 8 units available. Thompson v. HUD was decided in 2005 in favor of the 
public housing residents and extended the timeline of the Consent Decree. 
Racial segregation has always existed in Baltimore in a fine-tuned pattern 
enforced by a combination of legal power, monetary clout and private action. Nineteenth-
century street and alley segregation gave way to ghettos in East, West and South 
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Baltimore enforced by Jim Crow laws. As the process of segregation evolved the 
confusion between poverty, black skin and the inner city became more insistent. Poverty 
was perceived as criminal, contagious and immoral; the inner city was plagued with 
tuberculosis, venereal disease and illegitimacy – the common denominator in the white 
imagination was the black city resident. What was called “the Negro problem” in 1915 
evolved into the “urban problem” in the 1960s and today is seen as the safety or even tax 
base problem. Now at the turn of the twenty-first century “blight”, poverty and social 
problems in Baltimore are still branded “black”. White residents are warned never to 
enter the neighborhoods in West Baltimore that are almost 100% black because of the 
perception that these neighborhoods are breeding grounds for drug abuse and trade, 
violence and poverty. Unfortunately, some of these characteristics do exist in 
predominantly black residential areas in Baltimore City. Census maps reflecting 
population density and median income correspond to areas that are predominantly black 
(See Appendix 21 and Appendix 17). 30-40% of the residents in areas comprised of 80% 
or more black residents are living in poverty (See Appendix 20). Further correspondence 
can be seen between high rates of unemployment, 15% or higher, and black residential 
areas (See Appendix 19). These conditions are a symptom of residential segregation. 
They are a manifestation of discrimination, exclusionary location policies of Baltimore 
officials, and closed doors to housing, employment and community services. Residential 
segregation, a practice intentionally and strategically implemented by private citizens and 
local officials, is the common denominator in most of the social issues plaguing 
Baltimore’s black residents. 
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From 1910 to 2010 Baltimore’s black population increased from 85,098 to 
402,721 while the amount of white residents in the city declined from 473,387 to 211,285 
(See Appendix 24) This massive demographic shift, accompanied by drastic segregation 
visible in the landscape of Baltimore City, is reflective of changes and challenges that 
faced urban cities across the United States in the last hundred years. The creation of the 
hypersegregated city that Baltimore is today began with residential segregation 
ordinances in 1910, continued through slum clearance, restrictive covenants, redlining 
and was confirmed with the site selection practices of Federal Public Housing. Racial 
segregation subtly continues today within present day efforts at redevelopment. The 
coordination of local and federal government action, in concert with private choice, 
allowed local officials to pursue various methods to clear, consolidate and contain 
Baltimore’s expanding black population.  
The history of Baltimore’s segregation challenges long held assumptions about 
the hard line between de jure and de facto segregation. It has been generally assumed that 
segregation imposed by law, de jure, gives way to segregation that occurs in practice but 
is not necessarily ordained by law, de facto. However Baltimore’s segregation history 
contradicts this notion. After the first attempt by the local city council to impose 
segregation by law was struck down, Baltimore officials found support for segregation 
from federal policies. Rather than transitioning from government implementation to 
private action, as has generally been imagined, Baltimore transitioned from segregation 
imposed by a local body of government to segregation enforced with the help of the 
federal government.  
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 Popular culture has used Baltimore as an icon of the crime, poverty and drugs 
that plagues urban metropolitan centers across the United States. HBO’s The Wire 
highlights the negative aspects of Baltimore: rows of vacant houses, a poor public school 
system and deep-seeded poverty that leads to illegal drug abuse and violent crime. 
Ironically, or perhaps not, almost all of Baltimore’s flaws are characterized as black. 
Drug dealers and hit men are black, public school children are black, homeless addicts 
are black. In fact, the only white characters on the show are politicians, schools teachers, 
dockworkers and police officers. In five seasons of the show only season two tells a story 
of white corruption and the story of corruption is told as a consequence of 
deindustrialization – portside vice is not represented as the cause of industrial decline. 
Along with a continued examination of black drug trafficking in Baltimore, season two 
also presents a storyline about corrupt stevedores of the Baltimore port and their part in 
an international smuggling organization. The Wire’s portrayal of many social vices as 
black accurately reflects the mindset of many Baltimore citizens and leaders. 
Furthermore, the portrayal of the city as racially segregated both residentially and in 
terms of class, is reflective of current conditions in the city.  
However, the story of Baltimore presented in The Wire, much like the story of the 
city itself, is a metaphor for the issues and realities facing many American cities. 
Although The Wire is about Baltimore, the characters and events have their counterparts 
in other urban areas facing the same problems. Baltimore City demonstrates how 
residential segregation corresponds to high levels of poverty, unemployment, 
overcrowding. An idea that began with segregation ordinances in 1910 has grown into the 
defining, though largely unrecognized, characteristic of a great American city. 
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